



[Granville, John Carteret]

The state of the nation for the year 1747, ...






58 981 CIRI Y 586-3-18 -5 CHI SCHE.

[Consider Liver House of Granule]

Howard Las

Kinsa S. 1930

First Edn £6/6/-



ACTORISM CONTRACTORISM CONTRAC


THE

STATE

OF THE

NATION, &c.

[Price One Shilling and Six-pence.]



STATE

OF THE

NATION

For the YEAR 1747,

AND

RESPECTING 1748.

Inscribed to a MEMBER of the present PARLIAMENT.

Pro Libertate, Vitæ periculo decernendum est. Non enim in Spiritu Vita est, sed ea nulla est omnino Servienti.

HANC igitur occasionem oblatam tenete per Deos immortales P.C. & amplissimo orbis terræ consilii Principes vos esse aliquando recordamini. Tull. Orat.

LONDON:

Printed for M. COOPER at the Globe in Pater-noster Row. 1747.

a Ta

INTRODUCTION.

BEFORE the State of the Nation is entered upon for the current Year, it may be extremely necessary to form a brief Recapitulation of what we remarked under the same Title the last Year; not only as it will have a natural Connection with the ensuing, but will at the same Time evince the Impartiality of our Views, the Veracity of our Affertions, and the Effect of our Conjectures.

In the Preface thereto were inserted Facts, which demonstrated the vast Difference between the Expences for like Services, during Queen Anne's, and the present War; and that if the Revenues had been equally well husbanded now, as then, that we had been 8,000,000 less in Debt. And for the Truth whereof the said Preface is hereby referred to.

It was then remarked, that all our Disappointments, and the Evils naturally resulting therefrom, were entirely owing to the injudicious Choice of Persons employed in the Public Service; and the Difficulties we must be naturally driven to, if our Plan of Conduct was not altered. P. 3, 4.

It was next shewn, that it was not the Expence of the War, but the Application of the Money, that we disputed about. Agreeing it had been better to have raised double the Sum, so the War had been warmly pursued, and the French Trade ruined: But instead of so acting, we fell into a Lethargy, and an infamous Fawning on the French for Peace. To P. 5.

We then entered into a Discussion of the Question, Who were the greatest Enemies of the State, those who wrote against such Conduct, or those who pursued it? And proved it on the last. To P. 6.

We then shewed what Money would be wanted for the Service of the current Year; which

which stands there computed at 10,363,352 Pounds, and which will be found to vary little from the Truth, when what was ordered to be raised, and what Debts have been contracted, on Account of the current Service of the Year, are thrown together. And from thence concluded, that if the same Course was longer pursued, the Interest of our Debts would rise so high, that 7,000,000 would not serve the anual Exigencies of a dead Peace; and therefore proposed, in particular, an accurate Inspection into the Application of the Civil-List Revenue. To P. 10.

The Pretence of Ministers, who force themfelves into Power, was next considered, who found Affairs in a fine Train of Success, but, by their ill Conduct, threw them into Confusion. The Benefit of the Treaty of Wormes was evidenced, and the State and Nature of our own and the French Naval Power were compared and adjusted; with Calculations suitably adapted, with Remarks on our Navy Debt, and in what Manner accumulating. Upon the whole evidencing, that the French better protected their Commerce, at the Dif-

ference

ference of 2,456,000 l. Balance against us, and all this shewn by special Instances and Illustrations. To P. 19.

It was next attempted to shew the Necessity of absolutely destroying the French Commerce, because, as is evident to the Sense and Reason of all Mankind, it is what supports their Armies; and gave our Thoughts very freely in what Manner it was to be effected. We then recited that idle Expedition to Port l'Orient; shewed the Folly of pursuing it, at the Time, and in the Manner, it was attempted; and what better Account our Naval Military might have been turned to; and proved the Error of that Expedition, by shewing that it did not succeed, though neither opposed by the Enemy, nor by any Misfortune whatfoever. That it did no Good every Body agreed, but that it fenfibly injured us we proved, and concluded, that it was a fine Enterprize miferably murdered; and confequently, that our Ministers Heads were not suited to such Matters. And thence it became an Enquiry what they were fuited to; not to the Management of Revenues, was plainly shewn, as it was, that

that the private Interest of a few Men, overbalanced all Regard to the Honour, Welfare, and Prosperity of the State. To P. 32.

We then called upon the noble Person addressed to, in our own Name, and in that of the Nation, to confider the natural Confequence of all this in Time, and intimated to him the ruinous Effects of a Peace in such a Situation. especially as it was shewn, that the French Aids were lessened 224,000 Men since the Commencement of the War, which made a very confiderable Alteration in the State of the War, and the Enemy's Resource very far from the common Estimation; as they had lost feveral of their best Trades, therein ennumerated, and had only remaining the West-India Island and Missifipi, which we proposed the coming Summer might, with good Conduct, have been quite annihilated, and proposed the Means to that End, very contrary to the Meafures previously pursued. Ti P. 49.

We then entered upon the State of Europe in general; that our Revenues were at least as good as those of France, and our Alliances pretty

pretty equally balanced; our Navy equal to all Europe; and that France must soon sink under the Weight of the War; and consequently, that we were in a fair Way, by pursuing the War with Vigour, to end it by a glorious and successful Peace. And annexed thereto, by Way of Appendix, the French King's well-concerted Regulations of Convoys for the Islands belonging to that Crown in America, dated May 14, 1745; which was intended for, and did effectually shew our Negligence or Ignorance in similar Cases.



The S.T.A.T.E of

THE

11=0,5×1,-

NATIONAL DEBT.

THE National Debt 1744, being the first Year of the War with France and Spain, Navy Debt the same Year, 3,288,441

The National Debt 1740, 45,943,946 Navy Debt, 1,301,525 47,245,471

9,722,218

4,628,070
3,288,441
,339,629 1,000,000
2,339,629
- 1 1-
0-6
779,876
2,080,000
2,859,876
200,000
,059,876

The Money raised for the annual Service for the first four Years of the War with Spain, 1740, to 1743 inclusive, and for the four Years War with France and Spain, 1744,

to 1747 inclusive; with the Increase of the National Debt during that Time, and the Amount of the National and Navy Debt to the 30th of September, 1747.

	National Debt.	Navy Debt.	Total.
1740-4,059,72	2 245,943,946	1,301,525	47,245,471
1741-4,501.02	Increased,		9,722,218
1740—4,059,72 1741—4,501.02 1742—6,150,00 1743—6,562,49 1744—6,203,56	253,679,248	3,288,441	56,967,689
1745—6,462,901 1746—7,063,251 1747—9,425,253	1 2,298,657	1,339,629	13,638,286
	3 65,977,905	4,628,070	70,605,975

Thus it appears, that the National Debt, September 30, 1747, is, 65,977,905

The Navy Debt, 4,628,070

Total, 70,605,975

This Calculation is founded on the known increased Debt, the first five Years of 9,722, 218, whereby, and by the Sums raised each Year it appears, that all the Money above 3,550,916, supplied Annually out of the Land, Malt Tax, and Sinking-fund, are Debts; the Interest whereof, at four per Cent. excluding the last Quarter to Christmas, is 2,824,239 Pounds.

It appears above, that our annual Supplies, independent of Funds to pay Interest, is,

The Interest of our Debts, 2,824,239

Difference, 626,677

Thus it appears, that the Difference between our clear Supplies, and the Interest of our Debts, is but 626,677 Pounds. So that if there was a Peace, and the Land-Tax reduced to two Shillings in the Pound, or 1,000,000 less than now, the Revenue would be less than the Interest of the Debt, and consequently no Surplusage out of the established Funds to pay them off.

The Inference I would draw herefrom is, that we must either find Means to redeem our Debts, by Acquisitions from the French, or otherwise continue as much involved in Taxes, when a Peace is made, as in War, though perhaps not equally increase our Debts.

To prove this from indisputable Fact, I only defire it may be considered, whether if between the Peace of *Utrecht* and the Year 1740, very little or any of the Public Debts were paid off, though then but 50,000,000, I speak in the Gross, how much less can it be presumed, that

any

any will be paid off, suppose a Peace made this following Year, 1748, when the Debt will be near 80,000,000? So that, in Truth, we are fighting now for our Preservation, of which we shall speak more in it's proper Place. It remains only to shew the Difference between the Sums raifed in the first four Years of Oueen Ann's War with France and Spain, and those raifed the four Years of the present War with the same; esteeming the previous four Years War with Spain only, as no Kind of Parallel. For the last four Years some Allowance must be made, as the Debts are higher, but that is near balanced by the Sinking-fund; and the Cause of the real Difference was fully shewn, by balancing a few Articles in the State of the Nation for the last Year. I will not fay any Thing of the Duke of Marlborough's Success; but must remark, that he was always near equal to the Enemy in Point of Numbers, which we but too well know has not been the Case lately, though more Money paid than at that Time; besides that the Queen had an Army in Spain. As an Ally we have only loft Prussia, but then the French have not Bavaria; it may then be agreed, that the general State of Things is pretty equal. The different Sums expended, best seen by the following Tables.

. . . .

1744 6,203,562—1702	3,000,000
1745 6,462,901—1703 1746 7,063,251—1704	3,694,136 3,828,886
9,425,253—1705	4,670,486 Difference:
29,154,967	15,193,508 — 13,961,459

This is, upon an Average, 3,490,364 a Year, and the Charge of Queen Anne's War, on the fame Average, but 3,798,377; fo that the Difference between the Surplus in this War, and the whole Expence of Queen Anne's, is but 308,013. The Allowance for the Navy was the fame then as now, and the contracted Debts thereupon fomewhat allied. If we pay more Subfidies, or employ more Troops, then ought the End to be better answered, and we appear in the Field nearer on an Equality with the Enemy; but if that be not the Case, wherein confifts the vast Difference of Expence aggregating Annually, and forcing ourselves into a bad Peace, and, from the Day of it's being concluded, establishing us in Debt and Beggary?

The STATE of

THE

NATION.

HAVE a double Pleasure in entering upon the State of the Nation now, as it appears by the Recapitulation premised, that I was right in every Conjecture, and in that I have a most pleasing Prospect before me of seeing the Honour of my Country recovering, and our happy Constitution established on a durable Basis.

The Way to give Health and Vigour to the State, is the same, as to Cure malignant Disorders in the human Body, that is to say, by Sudorifics and Perspiration: The Illness thus driven off, sound Health returns, and the Patient sourishes again in full Bloom. In this Manner I propose to treat the Body Politic annually, until all its gross Humours evaporate.

The Reader will readily perceive that I am here talking in Metaphor, and that I mean by the Nation those who take upon themselves to govern it, independent of the Legal Establishment, in Consequence of a Kind of Self-Creation, which at once gave them Being, and constituted them a M—y. These are the Men, from whom I propose to sweat off all Errors and Malignancy, and by restoring them to a right State of Judgment give them Honour, and the Nation a well considered Peace.

A

The first Subject I shall enter upon, in Pursuance of this great End, is the State of the Navy, which we left last Year doing of nothing, yet vastly accumulating its Debts. The principal Use of a Navy, is the Protection of our Commerce, and the ruining of that of the Enemy's. By protecting of our Commerce, the Navy is supported; and by destroying that of the Enemy, our Own is necessarily improved, more especially in such Branches wherein we are more particularly Competitors, as in the Peltry or Fur Trade, in the Fishery, and in Sugars: As the Enemy's Interest in these Particulars decline, their Markets become ours, which will not only raise the Value of each distinct Commodity, but improve in a very fingular-Degree our Shipping and Seamen, in Confequence thereof the Growth of our American Colonies, and our Home Products and Manufactures; at the same Time that it lessens that of the Enemy, and at once lowers their Naval Power, and diffipates the Funds conflituted to support their Armies. And though we are not their fole Competitors in the East-India Trade, yet the Destruction thereof will divide the eventual Market between us and the Dutch, and contribute effentially to the Ruin of their Naval Power, the great End aimed at by this War, and whereby only we can be indemnified our Expences. The next is their Levant Trade, wherein we are perhaps more materially concerned, as a great Quantity of our Woolen Goods, of the best Kinds, are there vended. And lastly, the East Country Trade, which the French can have no Occasion for, when the others are annihilated.

This premised leads us into considering the Nature and Necessity of so conducting our Naval Affairs, as that the *French* Commerce as abovesaid may be effectually destroyed.

The British Navy is now in so happy a State, that we can always afford to have at Sea one hundred and

fifty Sail of Men of War, from feventy Guns downwards, while the French cannot any Way have above thirty at Sea on the same Average, and those fitting out of different and distant Ports, and therefore not readily drawn together. There being not now in France, by the best Accounts, above twenty Ships of the Line in all the Ports, and some of them quite unsit for Service. And it is no little Satisfaction to find that we have Officers in the Navy, both willing and capable to do their Duty, so that we are plainly in a Condition to ruin the French Trade: How it is to be done shall be mentioned hereafter, but what has been done, is at present under our first Consideration.

One of the principal Objects of the present War, in Consequence of the Treaty of Wormes, was to drive the French and Spaniards out of Italy. As this materially depended on the Conduct of the great Fleet we kept in the Mediterranean for that Purpose, it was necessary that the Ships should be so stationed, as that the Enemy might have no Supplies by Sea; but how that has been attended to, must appear by what has been done. It is notorious, that the French have from Time to Time landed large Bodies of Forces at Genoa, and that vast Numbers of fmall Vessels have continually supplied that City with Stores and Provisions, while we kept a Fleet there superior to all the Force of France and Spain together: A Fleet chiefly composed of large Ships, fome of them containing Men enough to have manned twenty Vessels, more fit for the Service in View, as those, wherewith the Enemy were supplied, usually were fmall and kept fo near the Shore; or feparated into small Divisions, pursued their respective Courses so many different Ways, and had always so short a Run to get in with the Land, on being chaced, that where one was taken, twenty must escape, supposing our great Ships really well stationed, and their Commanders active and attentive, which I con-

A 2

ceive

ceive will appear not to have been the Cafe. Here it is to be observed, that if the Enemy faved one Supply-ship or Vessel out of three, the main End of their fending them was fufficiently answered; as it could only make Provisions one Penny in three dearer; and as to Soldiers and Stores, it was only fending one Third more than was necessary, and their Business was done, with simply the Difference of one Third more Expence, which being so calculated, and confequentially profecuted, made no Kind of Difference in the Effect. But on the contrary, all that were faved, on the Prefumption of fuch Rifque, clear Benefit. And as that has been the Cafe, and that inflead of losing one out of three, they have not lost one out of twenty, Genoa is confiderably better supplied than it would have been if the Sea had been left quite open, which is very far from answering the intended Purpose. Now as a convincing Proof, that our Fleet has not been duly flationed this last Summer, we need only observe, that the same Stations, generally speaking, which might prevent the French or Neapolitans from supplying Genoa, must have intercepted the French Levant Trade, which, as we find not to have been done, we may conclude without farther Enquiry, that Port-Mahon Harbour has been more generally the Rendevouz of our Fleet, than that they have been disposed on cruizing Stations. And confequently have been of as little Service to the Allies, as to the Destruction of the French Commerce. And thus answering neither one End nor the other, might full as well have been at Home and out of Commission. As a Proof of the Justness of this Reflection, I find, that a Person of great Dignity in the State infifted fome Time fince on the nine great Ships being recalled from the Mediterranean, as they appeared to be useless there; which the L-ds of the A-y were ordered to direct accordingly.

I shall next turn my Thoughts on our Naval Conduct in Relation to the East-Indies. The State of our Affairs there was very well understood, the Number, Force, and Power of the French Armament, by more Channels than one, as I am able to prove, was known to be much superior to that under Commodore Barnet, and that the Enemy were meditating an Attack upon, and the Destruction of all our Settlements in that Part of the World, which was in some Measure effected by the taking of Madrass, and must have necessarily followed as to the residue, if a providential Storm had not done more in our Favour, than our Wisdom or Foresight seemed capable of. And was as much the Preservation of our remaining India Settlements, as another was of faving North-America the same Year; a Circumstance we all but too well remember, and in both Cases are more obliged to the immediate Hand, and indulgent Care of Providence, that Mr. de Bourdenay succeeded no better in the East, nor d'Anville no better in the West. Yet am I persuaded, on a fair Calculation, that the India Company had much better have paid the Expence of an additional Squadron, or our Navy Conductors increased the Publick Debt half a Million, than have fuffered Madrass to be taken, not only as to what was lost there, but likewise as to the Dishonour, so important a Loss must necessarily bring on a trading Nation, valuing itself on its maritime Strength and Power. 'A Dishonour not presently eradicated out of the Minds of the Indians, nor easily blotted out of the European Annals. A Dishonour that will be a Stain upon us to future Ages, and stamp a Mark of Infamy on our M-I Conduct.

What fome People were aiming at, in this melancholly Crifis, is not very difficult to guess. A Peace, the most wicked, that, considering the Nature, Reafon, and Circumstances of Things, ever entered into the Heads or Hearts of Men. A Peace, that must have reduced us to little better than a Province of France, and made us Slaves to her ambitious Dictates. A Peace, wherein must have been buried all our ancient Honour, reduced the illustrious House of Hanover to a Substitution and Dependence on that of Bourbon, and brought on with it fuch a Train of Miseries, as are not readily to be recounted. There needs nothing to prove the Intention, but the Nature of the Act, otherwise it might have been an Excuse, that our Ships had been wanted at Home; but it was evidently no fuch Thing, our Ships lay abfolutely idle, that is to fay, many of them at Spithead, and nothing done to annoy the Enemy, or pierce him in the tenderest Part, though the whole Coast of France quite open and unguarded. And what else but a bad Peace could all this tend to? a good one being only to be procured by beating the Enemy into right Terms: And a bad one, by letting the French take our India Settlements, and those of North-America. So that had we taken the Island of Bellisle, intercepted their Convoys, or alarmed their Coasts, we had spoiled their whole Scheme, and had a good Peace in spite of our Teeth. For it is to be observed, that had we taken Belliste, the whole Course of the French Western Commerce had been impeded, as we should thereby have commanded all the Harbours on the Coast. And if we had fell on the Coast of Stain, where there are not ten Thousand regular Troops in the whole Kingdom, it is possible that the Spaniards would have asked for a Peace. And if we had only attacked their Works before Gibi altar, wherein there was not, nor perhaps is now above four Hundred Men; it is possible that we might have demolished those Works, and had the Bay at Liberty, for our Men of War and trading Slops to have rode in, which is now fo far from be-Cafe, that they are either obliged to anchor Water, he among the ground Rocks, Subjectfubjected to the Hurricanes from the Hill, equally bad Anchorage, or to go into the New Mole, a proper Receptacle but for few Ships, and fo inconvenient for stationed Ships in Time of War, that the Enemy's Privateers carry their Prizes into their own Ports, on the other Side of the Bay, in Sight of them, without Remedy or Restraint. When we consider all these Things, and that the Alarming of the Enemy's Coasts must have drawn off their Armies from Italy and Flanders, we can be at no Loss to guess why it has not been, or is not still done; nor is it any other Way to be accounted for, but by the Hopes of making a bad Peace.

When we seriously consider the fine Situation Providence has thrown us into, almost in Spite of ourselves, a flourishing Navy, the People in high Spirits, and the Facility wherewith the French Commerce may be destroyed; and how nice and critical a Conjuncture presents, on which our All depends, while Fortune seems hovering over us, holding out to us the Hand of Plenty and Power: What Kind of wrong-headed People must we be, to shut our Eyes against the glaring Light of Meridian Day, and voluntarily involve ourselves in Darkness, Destruc-

tion and Dishonour?

There is one Thing I conceive we ought now to push for, if nothing else could engage us, that is, the only Means in Nature of paying our Debts, by the Increase of the Revenues resulting from the Acquisition of the French West-India and North-American Trade. This is so far from an Inducement to a Peace on any Terms, that I humbly think a good Politician would kindle up and cherish the Flames of War on the Continent, that we might have Time to bring this about. If a Thought of this Kind has any Thing immoral in it, I must beg the Reader to consider first the State and Nature of Things; whether it is not more just to encourage a War that must certainly A 4

ruin a determined Enemy, than a Peace which must ruin ourselves. All Mankind must know that the French will never make a Peace while Victors on the Continent, without fome obvious View of renewing the War again with Advantage, and confequently on fuch Terms as we cannot with Honour accept. On a like Footing with the War is the Trade. It is pretty near the Crisis that either the French or we must trade to no Purpose, and who in their Senses would doubt about the Alternative? The French have the better by Land, let them go on. Germany is the fure Grave of both their Wealth and Glory; our Business is to take Care to defend Holland as our own Frontier; and fince we cannot beat them on Shore to make ourselves and Allies Amends, by improving our Commerce on the Ruin of that of France, and thereby enabling ourfelves at once to find our Allies Money, who want nothing else to defend themselves, and secure to the Nation that Wealth, by which only the French are able to trouble the Repose of Europe. This I think is no immoral View, on the contrary, Self-prefervation, and the Sense and Reason of Things seems to command it. It is better to kill a Thief, before he fires his Pistol at me, than to wait the Event, at the Hazard of my own Life and Property. Common Sense indicates this to every intelligent Creature breathing, and the same Kind of Man who would stand patiently, and let a Thief rob and murder him, would make a Peace with the French, and quietly become their Slaves.

It is extremely necessary, on this Occasion, to distinguish between the Situation of the Affairs of Europe in general, and what regards Great Britain in particular. As to Affairs in general, the French have the Advantage, particularly on the Side of the Low-Countries, where their Troops are more numerous, and their Generals more experienced. On the con-

trary, as it relates to ourselves, our Maritime Strength is vastly superior, and has opened a Prospect before us of preserving this Superiority for ever. It is surely good then, that we seize this auspicious Conjuncture, and by a Spirit and Address, becoming Englishmen, render ourselves revered and dreaded; the happy Success of the Admirals Anson, Warren and Hawke, is an Earnest of our suture Glory, and so good a Beginning towards an Amendment in our Maritime Affairs, an evident Sign that we are in some Measure recovering our Senses; and very happily too at a Time, when it is the universal Opinion of the Nation, that nothing can save us, but pursuing with Vigour our present Advantages as a Naval Power.

In the West-Indies, it's true, we have neither had nor attempted Success, the Officers sent thither, one after another, have acted on Principles fo very like each other, and so little Notice taken of their Proceedings, except by a Kind of fictitious Trials, before People as wicked as themselves, that one is almost induced to believe, it was never intended they should be punished for either wilful Negligence or Cowardice, but rather, that they were supported by fome fecret Indications, that the worse they behaved, and the more they facrificed the Commercial Interest, the better their Conduct would be approved. And this feems the more probable, fince, notwithstanding the just Complaints of the Merchants, the Aggressors have not, in any Sense, selt the Weight of the Resentment of an injured People.

If there was any Thing singular in the Behaviour of the Naval Officers in the West-Indies, or did not others pursue the same bad Courses in the East-Indies; or had our Affairs in either been duly attended to, the other might have well been passed over as the bad Acts of the Officers respectively; but when we see such Conduct tacitly approved, it is

naturally

naturally to be imagined, they are not alone blamelefs.

It is certain, to a Demonstration, that it was known, Time enough to have been prevented, that the French were fitting out a Fleet under de Bourdenave. which was intended to destroy our East-India Settlements, yet not the least Care taken to prevent it. Our Squadron there was either strong enough to prevent the Confequences, or it was not. If it was strong enough, as they met the French with their full Power, why did they not repel them? or, on Failure, why not the Aggressors punished according to their Demerits? and if they were not strong enough, why not reinforced? Thus take the Point which Way we will, there is certainly, on the Face of the Argument, very strong Prefumptions of fomething extremely wicked at the Bottom; and evidently owe, in the first Place, the Preservation of our other Factories to a Providential Storm, and in the fecond and third, to the feverally intercepting the farther Detachments of the French that Way.

And here I shall beg Leave to take Notice of a Maxim ever attended to with Solicitude, by wife and experienced Statesmen, which is, That Commerce is supported (more particularly) in the East-Indies, by the Credit of the Power that feeks it; and that Credit ever acquired, by shewing, when Occasion commands, our Naval Force and Superiority. This is what is termed, in other Words, the Honour and Reputation of a Nation, that carries with it a Weight and Influence not to be balanced by Money. There is a Kind of special Regard to Reputation, that runs through the minutest of our Pursuits up to the highest, and gives the Party honoured a Figure and Dignity, that Wealth has the least Share in. It is the Sun that warms and influences, that first inspires us with Pleasure, next creates Admiration, and lastly,

makes either individual Persons, or embodied Com-

munities.

munities, reverenced and adored. This the French feemed to understand, by pushing their main Strength that Way. Providence, succeeded by Accident, has fully defeated their Views, and I hope at once opened the Eyes of, and convinced our blind Leaders of an Error, that might, if avoided by a judicious Attention at first, have contributed essentially to the Ending of the War with Glory, and thereby, at least, have saved us 10,000,000 of Money, and, instead of losing Madrass, put us in Possession of all the French Factories in India.

In the West-Indies we see the Case has been somewhat similar, it not having been possible for the French to have carried on that Trade now with a single Ship, if but a moderate Attention had been given to the main End of the War, for these two last Summers past; but as all this has happened in Consequence of a very extraordinary Change in the Admiralty, previous whereto one Fourth of the whole French West-India Men were captured in one Year; but at length other Measures took Place, and while we seemed wholly bent on having a Peace on any Terms, we struck directly into the Road that carried us a quite

contrary Courfe.

Here, as quite pertinent to the Subject, I must beg Leave to make some Remarks on the pernicious Confequences of insuring the Enemy's Ships, the unhappy Concomitant of various other evil Councils, in being permitted. This has been much talked of, often canvassed, but, as far as I can learn, never thoroughly adjusted. The previous Question is, whether we ought not to end the War with all imaginable Dispatch? The next is, whether, as Trade is undoubtedly the Support of the Enemy, and Credit the Support of Trade, we are not prolonging the War by aiding the Enemy's Credit? and whether insuring their Shipping is not aiding their Credit? There is nothing in Nature so demonstrable as this, and

and which all other Advantages can in no Sense balance. The first supposed Advantage is, that we got Money by it, or, in other Words, participated with the French in their Profits of Trade: But admitting this to be true, it in no Sense counterpoises the Sums spent to carry on a War, which the thus fupporting of the French Commerce aggravates, fince with the Ruin of that the War must end of Course. The fecond Advantage is, that by infuring the French, we must know when they fail, whereto, and under what Convoy. This is a Solecism in common Sense, to suppose that the Insurers will first sign a Policy, next inform of the Voyage, and lastly, pay the French the Loss. Though it is most certainly true, that if our Ministry could be presumed to have so much Wit, a few Thousands so employed would furely procure good Intelligence. But then they would take the Ships too it is to be hoped, and what then? why to be fure pay the French for their Losses, and fo aid them in trading on. But supposing this Hint to take Place, it will not help the Argument; for as the Nation may infure to the full Value, I can neither perceive where the Gain will be, nor how a Peace will be furthered thereby; on the contrary, if Trade be the Support of the Enemy, a War must be hereby perpetuated, on the Credit of our own Bottom, and we shall go on spending seven Millions a Year on the one Side, while we are using our Dexterity on the other, by putting the Enemy into a Condition to support it on their Part. The third and last Pretence for Insurance is, that if we do not do it Foreigners will. It may be fo; but if we are attentive, not long, as the Losses must fall too thick and heavy upon them. But admit that not to be the Case, what we then captured would be clear Gain, which, if infured fully here, must be a Loss to the Nation. We talked of gaining Intelligence in the fecond Case, but here, I am afraid, that it will be against

against us, and those ready to inform the Enemy, who are wicked enough to contribute to their Support, by joining with them to carry on their Commerce. I shall make but one Remark more. I take it for granted, that the Ruin of their Commerce will naturally produce an Annihilation, by Degrees, of their Naval Power, and consequently render our own Commerce more safe, extensive, and slourishing, and, what I think plainly follows, lessen our Insurance from ten or sisteen to sive or six per Cent. This all connects with the main Argument, and as to the Extension of our Commerce, is thus plainly shewn.

There are but two Capital Traders in the Sugar Way, the French and English, who are Competitors for all the Markets in Europe, excepting what are ferved from Surinam and the Brafils. So long as this Competition continues, by the endeavouring to underfell each other, the Markets must naturally run low, as well as be divided; but if the French Sugar Trade be ruined, all the Markets must devolve to us, and at the same Time be improved in their Value. It is faid that the French had, at the Beginning of the War, eight Hundred Ships in the Sugar Trade, which employed at least fixteen Thousand Seamen, and more Manufacturers and Mechanics of various Denominations; by which Trade, if they only gained the Support of thirty-two Thousand Seamen and Labourers, at one Shilling a Head a Day, it will amount to 5,84,000 Pounds Sterling a Year. And this must either be cleared, or the Trade cannot be carried on; and it must be observed, that this is without any Profit to the Trader, which being added, amounts to a Sum meriting our most earnest Attention, as it regards Infurances on the one Side, and the profecuting of the Naval War with Vigour on the other. What has been faid of the Sugar Trade will, on fimilar Principles, affect the North-American Fishery, Fishery, and which together are the main Pillars whereon the Power of France is fabricated. This confidered fairly leads us into a true Light, what Measures are most proper to reduce a People, whose Aim is Universal Dominion, and their Attention wholly turned to subject and enslave their Neighbours.

No Man can be insensible that we are now in a Situation capable of effecting the ruin of the French Sugar Trade, as in part is done by their Fishery already. Nor can any reasoning Man avoid seeing that the French are pushing farther on the Commercial Principle, and must inevitably carry their Point if they are able to conquer Holland, if they succeed in that before we have ruined their general Trade. On their being possessed of Holland, the whole System of Affairs will take quite a new Turn, either the Lovers of Liberty will drown their Country and retire hither; or if the French Party be more prevalent, the French will come into Possession of that rich Maritime Country, and therewith acquire an Addition to their Sugar Trade by having Surinam, and its highly probable the whole East-Indies.

If the first be the Case, and the Dutch do drown and leave their Country, the Conquest will avail the French little, as the main Wealth and People must be naturally transferred hither, and probably strengthen these Islands more against France, than if the Dutch continued in their present State, as it would bring the Herring Fishery to Scotland, and the East-India Trade to London, and with these a Store of Wealth, not to be counterpossed by any Acquisitions the French

are capable of making on the Continent.

On the contrary, as feems most probable, if the French should subdue Holland, and the People generally confent to live under a French Government on such fair seeming Terms as may be prescribed them, and we have not previously ruined their Naval Power,

we shall with the Loss of our Naval Frontier be reduced to the simple Dilemma of fairly fighting it out under infinite Disadvantages, or following the Example of our wise Allies, tamely submit to be the Slaves of French Insolence.

I am verily persuaded, that something of this Nature is nearly approaching, whether we continue the War, or agree to a shameful Peace; but with this Difference: That if the War is carried on by Sea with Skill and Spirit for two Summers, and Holland can be so long defended, we may in that Time put ourselves into a Condition to defy the warmest Essorts of French Power; but if we make a Peace, and the French thereby recover again their Commerce and Naval Strength, one single Summer's Campaign by Land and Sea may ruin the Work of Ages, and render the Power of France wholly irresistible. In this I see not any rational Alternative, nor can conceive on what Terms it's possible to make Peace, but such as must be attended with inevitable Ruin.

Our Navy now is just coming into that State and Order which adapts it to the pursuit of a vigorous War; we have now Admirals, Captains, and Seamen, that have learned to fight: The Sea open to us, and all the Power in our own Hands: We have feen what a despicable Figure we made at first setting out, and all our Poltrons even not yet hanged out of the Way, or discharged. A few Years will disperse the brave Fellows that now subsist, and we shall return again to our primitive Meanness, while the French will be planning out our Ruin, taking every Advantage of our Indolence and Corruption, and will lead us on with a malicious Smile the smooth Road to Destruction. In a word, it may be faid in general, as to our Naval Affairs, if Men in Power will but in Earnest punish those Wretches, who in the West-Indies and nearer home have made their Country a mere stalking Horse, and that hold Courage and Ho-

nour in Contempt, it is not in the least to be feared but we may in one Summer's warm Attention to a Naval War, amply repay ourselves the Expences of the War, as thirty or forty Millions may be soon returned to the Nation in the Fishery and Sugar Trade; fince it will be very hard if those Trades, which effectually support the French in their Wars, will not in a few Years as effectually clear our Debts. I believe, after what has been faid, the Reader can hardly doubt the Success of vigorous Measures, nor the obvious Consequences: But we must hope at the same Time, that the Nation is to be obliged with the preferring and employing only of fuch Men as have proved they have the Interest of their Country at Heart: Not fuch as have either run away from the Enemy, or left their Commanders to pursue the Circuit of the Globe alone. There is no need to mention their Names, as an indelible Mark of Infamy is stamped on them, which neither Age nor Time can obliterate. To this I think may be added, that I hope the Folly of fitting out three Deck-Ships will be laid aside, and the Number of Ships, rather than their Magnificence, attended to, and a Sufficiency of fuch employed in the West-Indies, and annually relieved; that so we may constantly have there Ships sit for Service, our Men preserved, the Enemy destroyed, and our own Trade fafely convoyed.

I think we have now pretty well travelled through the State of our Naval Affairs, and confidered incidentally the Nature and Effect of War and Peace; we come next to the State of the Army, with that the Nature of our Contracts and Alliances, and in fine, the whole System of our Situation on the Continent.

Before we take particular Notice of the Number and Conduct, the Money given for, and the Troops employed, I shall take upon me in the first Place to give the Reader a clear Idea of the State, Nature and Interest of our respective Alliances. It has ap-

peared

peared evidently enough on the Part of the King of Sardinia, that he has in every Respect complied with his Engagements, that he is entitled to the Dominions allotted him by the Treaty of Wormes; and has by the Diversion given the French rendered that Nation unable to make fuch violent Attacks on the Side of Flanders as might otherwise have been done. or to spare any Troops for the Setvice of the Pretender. Thus far our Alliance is very happy, but there is fomething interferes on this Occasion, which merits our Attention. We pay a certain Subfidy to the King of Sardinia, and vote another to the Court of Vienna, and stipulate for a certain Number of Men to be brought into the Low-Countries, and on the Credit of these Stipulations, and the Number of Men voted over by Parliament, we are prefumed to bring into the Field 140,000 Men into Flanders; instead of which, there has not appeared 90,000, the Difference is 50,000 at least: Upon asking where are these Men so paid for, it is answered, that the Necessity of farther aiding the King of Sardinia has drawn them into Italy. Whether this be true or false matters little, it must have been well known what Power the French could bring into the Low-Countries, and that the Dutch were in no Sense our Friends: If therefore it was necessary to further aid the King of Sardinia, there is nothing clearer, than that we had infinitely better have doubled that King's Subsidy, than wanted the Austrian Troops in Flanders, as his Majesty could therewith have had Swifs Troops, better answering his good Intention, as his Command of them would have been absolute. But I am afraid, that the Austrians are rather pursuing Ends of their own, and making Acquisitions in Italy, at our Expence, than pursuing the main End of the Alliance. And if this be the Case, we are perpetuating the War to no Kind of Purpose, and, instead of beating the French into good Manners, are fuffering

fuffering them to gain Ground, where we can only dread them, while our Allies are conquering, what to us is perfectly infignificant. This is not carrying on the War fairly, it is only making ourselves the Dupes and Bubbles of those, we have purely undertaken the War to preferve, and are thereby, instead of beating the French out of Flanders, drove to the only Resource we have left, of defending Holland. It is very true that the Dutch do not deserve our Aid, nor many of the principal Men desire it, but alas! we have no Alternative. There is an honest Party there that we are bound in Honour to protect, and with them, in Effect, our own Frontier. Our Inattention to Maritime Affairs, as has been before observed, has not reduced the French low enough by Sea to make it indifferent to us what becomes of Holland, and therefore ought to have had all the Troops we pay, or agree for, to have prevented the French making any Acquisitions there; so that, upon the whole, it matters little to fay, that they were employed in Italy, as their being employed there may be attended with more fatal Confequences to us, than if the French had been possessed of all Italy. Our Business is certainly to keep the Enemy at a Distance, not to pay for bringing them Home to our own Doors. If the King of Sardinia wanted more Aid, furely he would best have had it in Money. This I hope clears up all that vague Reasoning and Pretence our ministerial People are so fond of in their Justification, and sets us right in a Point of the last Importance to our Safety; but leaves us in Doubt what Construction to put on that Conduct, which at once facrifices our best Men to superior Force, backens the Reputation of our noble young General, and runs us upon the Brink of Destruction.

There is another remarkable Inconvenience has attended the Troops agreed for, not being applied to the proper Service, which is, the not having

it in our Power to keep any Number at Home for the making Descents upon, and alarming the Coasts of France, which might have had a very good Effect, and lessened considerably the Number of the Enemy in the Low-Countries, by the Necessity of drawing them off to desend their own; and as their Coast is so extended, must have either weakened their Army more in Proportion to the Numbers sent there, than would have balanced the like Number being sent into the Low Countries, or must have put them to equal Expence another Way. But however that might have answered, it is at least very obvious, that we ought to have calculated Numbers so well, as not to have been merely defensive in the Field, and by seeing the best Towns of Holland taken before our Faces, submitted to be esteemed of

little Reputation in Europe.

The Effects of such Proceedings are to be dreaded more Ways than one. When the Duke of Marlborough commanded, the common Soldiers fignalized themselves in a distinguished Manner, not only as they depended on the Judgment of their General, but as they knew he was always provided with a fufficient Force to carry any Point, he determined on; and as they found him always fuccessful, it seems to me evidently to follow, that where the contrary is apparent to them, that is, where they always find themselves, by Means of their vast Inferiority, either led like Beafts to the Slaughter, or tame Spectators of the Success of an Enemy, whom they in their Hearts despise, their Courage must be naturally damped, and the Men defirous, in their Hearts, rather to quit all Notions of Honour, and the Service of their Country, than to fuffer themselves to be so idly abused. If any Man in Power is either so weak or wicked, as, from particular political Views, to be the Author of such infamous Means, tending at once to murder our brave Men, and ruin his Royal B 2 Highness's Highness's Reputation with that of the Nation's, furely he may be justly branded with an indelible Mark of Ignominy, and handed down to Posterity, as the worst Kind of Enemy to his Country. It matters not to say we are deceived by our Allies, and this Argument used Year after Year, till the Enemy, by one Victory more, or perhaps without any, will be in Possession of all Holland. It is plain that, through Ignorance, Carelesness and Corruption, not to say worse, these Inconveniencies are brought upon us.

As on the one Side we fee our Army idly facri-. ficed to political and venal Views, fo on the other, we fee abroad our Military Governors making a Property of the Nation, and railing valt Estates out of the Blood and Vitais of the People. It would be therefore very proper for the Publick to know what Troops we have at Anapolis Royal, how they are cloathed, and how paid. That Government, which is the Barrier of our Northern Colonies, and where the Inhabitants are generally our Enemies; with what Stores that Garifon is provided, and whether not capable of being taken by five Hundred Men. How this has been passed over unnoticed so long, is to me perfectly inconceivable; and if those in Power do not know the State and Condition of that Garifon, and what a Property has been hitherto made of it, they must soon be further informed by a distinct Publication, which I have not Room to infert here, and which I am fure the Legislature ought to be acquainted with.

The next is, that important Fortress Gibralter, where arbitrary Power, Venality, and Misrule, in many Respects, outvys Anapolis Royal. The Bay of Gibralter is full of Fish, and the adjacent Coast of Barbary extremely well stored with all Kinds of Provisions, yet, at Gibralter, even an Officer can hardly afford to purchase himself a fresh Dinner, all Pro-

visions

visions being so excessive dear. The Governor is Landlord of all the Houses, Butcher, Poulterer, Fishmonger, Oilman, Wine-Merchant, &c. A Vesfel can go to Tetuan, or Tangier, and return to Gibralter freighted with Bullocks, Sheep and Fowl, in forty-eight Hours in moderate Weather, let the Wind blow which Way it will. I have forgot the Price of Beef, but Mutton is about five Farthings a Pound on an Average, and Fowls at about two Pence halfpenny. A Vessel makes a fine Freight of these at fifty per Cent. Profit, but five Hundred per Cent. does not buy them, after being landed at Gibralter. Fish any Body might catch enough in an Hour to ferve three or four Families, but that is not permitted; fo that I need not say any Thing of Wines, Oils, Beer, Potatoes, Salt, Fish, Butter, &c. &c. all is there of a Piece, and in short there is not a Way in Nature, that the meanest Mechanic would employ to get Money, that is not used here by the Commanding Officer: So that the Garison is not indeed starved, but sleeced, and all the Money remitted thither centers in the Purses of a very few, if not in one only. Formerly it was divided between the real Governor, his Deputy, the Commanding Officer, and Town-Major, but Taxes then nothing near fo exorbitant as now; and indeed it would puzzle one to learn, by what lawful Authority they dare tax the Inhabitants at all. Herein confists the main Secret, why Gibralter is not made a Civil Government, and filled with Merchants, as it would naturally be, and support its own Expences. The Forts without the Town in the Enemy's Hands, perhaps permitted, because it is inconvenient for Ships to ride there long, and so fewer Witnesses to this happy military Conduct. The whole Account whereof, like that of Anapolis Royal, being too prolix for the prefent Infertion, must be left to be published with a general State of the Army; but I hope B 3 enough

enough has been hinted regarding both, to demand a strict Enquiry into a State of the respective Garifons; more especially when Remittances shamefully reduce the Soldier's Pay, the allowed Contingencies not applied, and the same Garison continued, for fear of publick Complaint, so many Years together.

Thus we see, without regarding other petty Matters, the delicate Situation of our Army Affairs; Holland, our European Barrier, on the Point of being swallowed up; our Troops butchered, through their Inferiority, though we pay for double what we bring in the Field; Anapolis Royal, our American Frontier, open to the Invasion of the Enemy; and Gibralter made a Property of within, and blockaded by four Hundred Men without; his Royal Highness's Reputation at Stake; and the whole Nation sinking, not under a War, but by the Effect of Negligence, Venality, and Corruption.

Our Money Affairs come next in Place, with which I think it is right to take in the Nature of Taxes, and the Course of Smuggling, as the same still continues, though not in so high a Degree since the

lowering of the Tea Duty.

The Nature of Taxes, what Kind are equally just and beneficial, and which unequal and injurious, has been so often demonstrated to the Public, that it would be idle here to repeat, was it not for the Sake of the Inferences I propose to make therefrom. All Taxes laid on the Materials for manufacturing with, on the Manufactures themselves in the Workman's Hands, or on Commodities in the Merchant's Warehouse, are in their Natures very different from what is paid by the last Retailer, and still more, from what is paid only by the Confumer. As the Advance Cash raises the Price of the Commodity, through every Hand it passes; so that a Duty of twenty Shillings may render the Commodity five Shillings dearer to the Confumer, while it brings in only twenty Shillings

Shillings to the Revenue, but the Difference would be \(\frac{1}{4} \) more to the Revenue, if the Confumer paid; and yet he will pay no more than he would have done, if the Manufacturer or Merchant had only paid the Revenue twenty Shillings. I know the Difference is more than \(\frac{1}{4} \) in most Cases, but that is sufficient to my present Purpose, and cannot be too often inculcated, for the following Reason: The National Debt now is about seventy-one Millions. Thus:

At Christmas last,
Debt since created,
Navy Debt then,

Voted off last Sessions,

62,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000

72,000,000

Total remains,

71,000,000

Now as there would have been at least one Fourth more raised, if our Taxes had been laid on the Confumer, our Debt would have been one Fourth less, that is to fay, only fifty-fix Millions, but if nicely inspected into, not near that, for Reasons too prolix to be shewn here. In the Light it stands, it anfwers the Use I would make of it, which is to shew, that so large a Debt, now accruing, is likely to involve us in deep Perplexities, if we do not recur in Time to that obvious Method of rendering all our Taxes equal, by throwing them on the Confumer. The fecret Objection, which is the not employing fo many Officers, and confequently the weakening the Hands of the Ministry, being of little Import, fince Necessity will foon enforce it, or an Annihilation; but while the first is an obvious and honest Remedy, I fancy no Body will be weak or wicked enough to attempt the last.

B 4

It is conceived that including the Navy, there will be this Year a farther Debt created of eight Millions, which makes in the whole feventy-nine Millions. And as the Interest rises on the latter Debts, so on a similar Principle of proceeding there will be every Year a Necessity of raising more Money than in the preceding, gradually increasing to nine, ten, or eleven Millions, all which might be either borne or avoided, if, as observed before, we were hearty in the pursuit of the War, and Destruction of the French Commerce. But if this great Point, the only one that can either support the Ministry, or preserve the Nation, is not purfued, and we go on accumulating Debts by Interest on the Deficiencies, as well as on the answering Duties, it's difficult to fay where it will End, but most probably in an infamous Peace, and consequently

the becoming a Province to France.

It's a pity that even the most desperate Necessities of the State won't turn the Minds of Ministerial Men, to the reflecting on the impending Danger, nor feek to stielter themselves under the hospitable Cover of evident Rectitude, which a due Care and Disposition of the Revenues naturally prefents to them. The Error whereupon all these false Measures hang consists of various Parts: The wrong Bottom whereon Money is raised, the injudicious Manner of borrowing it at high Interest, or what is equivalent to it, and the Course pursued to borrow it on such Terms. This mistaken Method appears thus. The C-r of the E-r fignifies to his Agents, that fo many Millions must be borrowed for the Service of the Year. They upon this form a Plan, valuing the Funds confiderably under the then nominal Price, after which they found their Patron, and from thence form a Judgment what Interest he expects to give. They then fet their Engines to work both here and in Holland, and fell Quantities of Stock for Time in the latter Place, to as to secure to themselves a certain Profit.

They engage besides as many of their Friends as they can, Abroad and at Home, to give them their Names for certain Sums to be afterwards subscribed in a List. which they affure them they shall have. By this Means, when their Patron is near ripe for concluding a Bargain, they being all along privy to the Progress he makes, and confequently judges if the Plan is likely to fucceed or not, the alternative being now in their Power. In Case the Plan is not likely to succeed, their Friends have the full of what they gave in their Names for, but otherwise they are reduced to ²/₁ ¹/₃, or perhaps to nothing at all. This Practice, now to generally well known on the Exchange, has been pursued more or less by these Court-Operators for fome Years past. But as this is carried on to the great Prejudice of the run of Subscribers both at Home and Abroad on the one hand, so on the other it is conducted to the great Emolument of the Operators themselves, some secret Friends, and the T-y Vultures, who reap therefrom a fine annual Harvest: As what is struck off from the beneficial Subscriptions is divided among them, which they immediately dispose of in Exchange-Alley, and then divide the Booty. Thus the S-e, the Dutch, and their own Countrymen, are regularly plundered, to maintain the Extravagance and Luxury of a few, and is among those high Instances of good Management, whereby a War is to be supported, and the Nation preserved from Ruin. Publick Credit is the Basis whereon is built the Welfare of the State; when that is played Tricks with the whole Superstructure totters, and therefore as that is managed, a M-y is to be judged of or depended upon, which how far it has been the Case here, the following Instance may fairly elucidate.

In the Time of the Rebellion, when no one will dispute the Danger publick Credit was in, nor the Necessity of supporting it, a Subscription was open-

ed on the Land-Tax at a publick Tavern in the City. when these great Men subscribed pretty largely, in order to make a Figure, and to ingratiate themselves with the M-r, which they took Care at the fame Time to dispose of in Holland at a considerable Discount. Hence the Publick may fee what Kind of Men they are who affect to support their Credit, when on the one Side they aim to appear the Friends of the Nation, while on the other they were thus undervaluing the best Security we have to give. For I think I need not intimate that a more likely Method to have ruined our Credit could not have been contrived, as every intelligent Man must readily perceive. Thus we fee that at the most critical Conjuncture what Kind of Friends these M- Agents are to the Publick, how much less then are we to expect any Thing from them that's good? The general State and Situation of our Affairs has been already shewn in regard to the Navy and Army; the Government of G-r and Anapolis hinted at, the Nature of our Taxes confidered, and traced through their false Courses, and now as if the bad Management of our Finances did not contribute fast enough to our Destruction; we shall next see that all the Rapparees in the Kingdom are affociated, and their Villanies connived at, while they rob and plunder with Impunity. These are a set of Gentry well known by the Name of Smugglers, whom it's much easier to profecute and convict, than to get executed. The Use hitherto made of their Crimes, instead of punishing them, has been chiefly to keep the Criminals in Terrorem with the Rod of the Law over their Heads, lest they should vote freely. This answers better than Punishment, because by preserving them, the Liberty to plunder keeps them in a right Situation for voting at Elections; fo that as their Cue is understood on the one Side, their Privilege is established on the other; and instead of checking this infamous Practice.

Practice, is a tacit Encouragement, and carries into Idleness and Roguery all such as are blinded by prefent Interest, and are not capable of the best regulated Principles. Men of ordinary Minds are apt enough to commit bad Actions, though with a Halter about their Necks; but how much more fo, when a Gold Chain is their Reward, and they can boldly fay, we contemn the Laws, and bid Justice Defiance, can be Spies to the Enemy, fupply them with Arms, and publickly plunder in Bodies with Impunity? When we find this added to all we have faid before, there can be no Wonder at our being necessitated to beg. Peace of an Enemy fince; they who have no Government that are in a State of Anarchy and Confufion, that facrifice all that's great, good, and just, to Folly, Nonfense, and Venal Views, are naturally calculated for Slavery, and confequently wish a Peace, only that they may have fome Chance to acquire thereby the Favour of those whose Chains they pro-

pose one Day to wear.

It was a Maxim among the old Romans never to leave an Enemy unconquered, nor to give an Ally the least Cause of Suspicion. This Uniformity of Action supported that wife State in all its Viciffitudes and Distresses, and raised it in the Event to that Pinacle of Glory wherein Augustus Casar found it. the political Arts, the Tricks and Chicanry, confequent of finister Views and narrow Thinking, which so much possesses the Breasts of modern Ministers. can in no Sense produce a similar Effect as that simple Principle of steady Uniformity. That answers effectually every Purpose of witty Devisement, never fails of its End, nor ever deceives any Body. This makes a Nation dreaded by its Enemies, and revered by its Allies, and gives it a Figure and Dignity no complicated Arts can render it capable of attaining. The French fee this and purfue it, not fo fimply, fo not with equal Effect as the Romans. The Dutch

have purfued a direct contrary Course, and, by losing Sight of the happy Principles of their Forefathers, have brought themselves into that Danger and Distress we now see them in. The good Genius of Britain, in Spight of the Folly and Wanton. ness of her Ministers, has faved us hitherto, though more than once on the Brink of Ruin, by the Aid of some few determined Minds, battling against idle Treaties and Negotiations, now reviving again, and therefore still must be opposed. Uniformity is Rectitude itself, and by a steady Adherence, though on but a moderate concerted Plan, is superior to the best laid Scheme unsteadily pursued. In a Word, it is the Fountain from whence National Glory, with all her attendant Bleffings, spring, and consequently has no Relation to, or Connection with vague Meafures, which ever embarrass Regularity, and turn Harmony into Discord: Therefore a Stranger to fuch Expedients; as leave our Politics loofe and unfettled, and which, on the constituting a Peace, involves us in perpetual Wars.

In the Time of our Edward the Third Uniformity of Action appeared in it's full Spirit and Splendor, this at once animated our Councils, and gave Vigour to our Arms. The same Prince that headed the Army, ruled in the Cabinet: Nor has there been a Sovereign, from the Time of this Edward to that of Elizabeth of immortal Memory, but what looked on the Court of France as their Enemy, and always fo treated it. After which a long Interval furnishes us at once with different Politicks, and less glorious Monarchs, till William III. like another good Angel, appeared to redeem our past Follies, to recover our lott Commerce, and to inspire us with a just Sense of the imminent Danger attending us, by being in Friendship with France, who had then, by reciprocal Dealing, a Balance of above a Million annually against us. The first seven Years of Queen And's Reign

Reign brought our Disputes to a happy Issue, and France then trembled at the Name of Britain, when a Ministry, never to be forgotten, raised and softered by Faction, started into Power, and, by a scandalous and ignominious Peace, laid the Foundation of all the Expence, Troubles, and Perplexities, we have since laboured under. This subsequently aggravated by narrow Councils, not a little improved our Difficulties, and threw us into that variable State we seem now so fond of continuing in, by entring on another Peace, which, if carried into Execution, must improve the Evil in Proportion, as one Error ag-

gravates another.

In the Pursuits of France, as eying Universal Monarchy, a steady Regard is had to the keeping up a traiterous Faction here, and a Band of Pensioners in Holland; the only two Powers whose Opposition that Crown dreads, and who are able, with Unanimity, to reduce it to what Degree of Contempt they pleafe. Yet should France, by such Conduct, be able to overrun Holland, the being possessed of her Naval Ports and Shipping, the Spirits of the Difaffected here will naturally exult, and it will then foon be feen who are in their Hearts the Friends of France and the Pretender. Those who think to put a Stop to these Things, by making a Peace, are pursuing a notorious Solecism, as it is evident, that the Dutch Pensioners have only lost their Power by the War, and which they may recover again by a Peace, with the fingular Advantage of being better guarded for the future against the Orange Interest, and the Potency of the People; the Armies of France easily introduced, and the whole Power of Holland thrown into the Hands of that Crown; which is to far from being impracticable, that it is more than probable, fince the same Men, who have already facrificed their strongest Towns to France, will, upon similar Principles, readily enough furrender, the Residue of their Coun-

try; which the Stadtholdership Settlement may not be able to prevent, fince a French Army entring on a fudden, and fo many Capital Burghers as must still remain in that Interest, will be, when lulled afleep by a flattering Peace, too hard for the Stadtbolder's Friends, especially should the Prince dye, and that Dignity be vested in an Infant, which may eafily be put out of the Way, and the Government run again in it's old Channel, and then France take Possession at Pleasure. This concerns us essentially, as the losing of Holland removes our Capital Barrier both by Sea and Land; and at the same Time is the Basis whereon our internal Enemies will construct our Ruin. When Holland is gone, we not only lofe a Country, but at the same Time erect a Naval Power, equal to our own, facing us at a small Diftance, and then have but a faint Chance to preserve our Commerce, if we shall be able to defend ourfelves, at Home, our domestic Rights and Liberties. While, on the other Hand; we are morally fure, by a War vigorously pursued by Sea, to destroy the French Commerce; and by barely defending Holland with our Troops, at once fave the Country, and support the Stadtholder's Interest; and with that engage a Naval Power in our Service, that will effectually destroy the Enemy's Trade, and with that entirely blast all the pernicious Schemes of France, projected to enslave Europe. It is clear to the meanest Understanding how low the French Naval Power is. the Dutch covering the Sea with Privateers, must still lessen it, and our own Naval Power, with great Facility, finish it's Destruction; and this, with due Attention, may be effected in one Summer.

It is no Paradox to fay, that Commerce is the Basis of Dominion, nor is it difficult to conceive that what the French lose, is our Gain. All agree, that the French Commerce, before the War, was more extensive than our own, nor will any one dispute

that it brought them more Wealth. It naturally follows, that such Addition must increase our Power, and in Proportion lessen that of *France*. who, by having no Commerce, must drop all her destructive Projects for want of a pecuniary Support; and confequently, the destroying the *French* Commerce produce such a Peace as we want.

A Peace as firm and lasting, as glorious and beneficial; not productive of new Wars, nor making Peace and War equally expensive to us; not keeping us always in Terror, and upon our Guard; not fearing Invasions, nor dreading internal Enemies: But a Peace that must make the French perpetually dependent upon us, that will cure them for ever of setting the World in a Flame, and make them as much the Contempt, as they are now the Dread of their Neighbours.

The Ministry cannot pretend that we want either Money or Means to effect this. They fee Money flow in upon them faster than they want it; the Parliament give every Thing they ask, and the People's Purses are open to them. I know where the Shoe pinches very well, and push them now upon speaking out if they dare. Our Fleet is such a one as this Nation never faw before, it lies upon them to take Care whom they employ, and how they conduct it. If that Fleet cannot make such a Peace as we want in one Summer, I know what fome People deserve: The Plan is fairly before them, and Affairs now so constituted, that it is not Wit and Judgment, but simple Honesty, that is to do all our Business. The Nation expects it done, they want not a Peace by Negotiation, but by Arms; a Peace that will execute itself, and be perpetual. We want the French Trade, it is in our Power, and we infift upon having it; and they who use any Arts or Power to prevent it, or do not vigorously pursue the Point, are Enemies to their Country, and must by some Means

Means or other be treated accordingly, and I hope fuch Means will not be wanted. Since your Peace-Hunters, by Negotiation, draw a poisoned Arrow out of a French Quiver, and if they pretend, at the fame Time, that they love their King and Country, I would only ask them the following plain Questions: Has not the French King affronted his Majesty the King of Great Britain, and the whole Nation, in the Face of the World? Has he not sufficiently declared his Intention of Subverting our happy Establishment, and of imposing Popery upon us, by declaring the Pretender our King, and affisted him with Arms, Men, and Money? If this be the Case, what Measures have we to keep with such a Sovereign? And why should not his Power be levelled as low as possible? But if that was not the Case,

Justum est bellum quibus necessarium; & pia Arma, quibus nulla, nisi in Armis, relinquitur spes.

When all that has been faid comes to be feriously considered, we shall be at no Loss to guess why there is such an absolute Necessity of Ministerial Attention, towards the securing of C-ys and B-ghs, for the special Purpose of putting Men in, aptly turned, to co-operate in any Measures, magisterially dictated to them. The P--t is the Basis whereon all our Security rests; if that should gradually work into a Quick-fand, the Superstructure will proportionably fink and totter: And as the P-t, while standing firm, is the only Check that Ministers have to fear; so is the Art of the Minister more especially pointed to the Management of the P--t, which perhaps employs more of his Time and Skill, than all the weighty Affairs of the State put together. Consequently, on the Eve of a new Parliament, all the brightest Faculties of his Mind are turned attentively to that fingle Object, to pro-

£ 1201 1

cure a Majority of Friends, as being, by their Aid, capacitated to act, as appears best to suit his Interest, and that of some sew about him. But as to what more immediately regards the King and the Constitution, they are lest to be considered another Way. After duly reflecting on these Remarks, which are, unhappily, but too true, neither what has been previously said, nor the Matter, contained in the Subject I am now entring upon, will at all surprize the Reader, or leave him at any Loss to guess at the Source of every rising Evil.

pal Causes occasioning that Dissolution.

The Reader must first please to take Notice, that, at all Events, the Parliament had regularly but one Sessions more to sit; that our Affairs Abroad were very critically circumstanced, by a Revolution of Power in Holland, and that a Party of some Consequence were pushing, with uncommon Vigour, an early Interest in their respective Neighbourhoods, and this with the Sanction of so illustrious a Personage, as might naturally enough make the ministerial Party dread the Effects.

The Revolution of Power in Helland, the Choice of a Stadtholder, the supporting him when chose, and the establishing of himself and Successors in that high Station, in Opposition to the French Interest, depended essentially on the having such a Parliament here, as would not cross or consound any Measures requisite to this great End, and consequently, that such a Parliament should be settled for

C a Term,

a Term capable of bringing this important Point to Perfection. Connected herewith is our own particular Situation, the Improvement of our Maritime Affairs, the Augmenting our Land Forces, and the Completing of our Alliances in fuch Manner, as that the English Party in Holland might not only have a present but future sure Dependance on us for their Support; but also be able to bring over the Disengaged, and, either by Reason or Terror, cause some of the French Party to fall into the Interest of their

Country.

They faw plainly how this might be obstructed, if due Regard was not had in Time to Information received in Holland of the Progress making by the Anti-Ministerial Party, in whose Favour a certain Circumstance occurred, of a very uncommon Nature, and which getting Time to mature, might have produced an Effect not perhaps in Disfavour of the Common Cause; but that might have procured a Change in the British Ministry; and as it could not be certainly known who would fucceed, the Measures taken with those in Power might probably disconcert all their previous Agreements. The Judicious among the Dutch did not doubt, but the Successors of the present Ministry would have been Men of betser Abilities, and equally in their Interest; but they were justly aware, at the same Time, of the invidious Use that would have been made of our seeming Inconstancy by those in the French Interest, and which might have staggered, if not engaged with them, those who had not hitherto joined any Party. As this might have been a great Check to their happy Beginning, and perhaps made the Difference of a Campaign in their Disfavour; it seemed but good Politics in the Dutch Patriots, to employ all their Art and Interest to support the British Ministry, in Opposition to that rising Genius of the Nation, whom, in any other Circumstances, they would rather have engaged

engaged with. The uncommon Circumstances mentioned above, which the Dutch dreaded the Effect of at this critical Conjuncture, and our M-y more, was the starting up of an antiquated Right in the Dutchy of Cornwal. I need not tell my Readers what a Number of Members that County affords. nor consequently what Weight their being all of a Side must have given to the Anti-Ministerial Party. There was at this Time produced to Light fome old Records of the Dutchy, which seemed to give a Right to the Prince of Wales, as Duke of Cornwal, of convening any where, within the Limits of the Dutchy, a Parliament of Tinners, to be continued together fo long as their Principal, or his Deputy. by his Directions, should think convenient. As most of the Heads of Boroughs, and Men of the best Interest in the County, hold of the Dutchy, are therefore obliged it feems to attend this Convention. or forfeit their Estates; and as they could have been thereby obliged to vote as directed, all the Members must have been necessarily chose, that were Anti-Ministerial Adherents. This to be sure, at so delicate a Crisis, alarmed the M-y, and put them on using their best Efforts to obviate so important an Opposition, as such a Balance against them must have created. It happened very luckily for them, that these Records were not in the Hands or Power of any of the Dutchy Officers; they were in the Hands of an eminent Lawyer, unbiassed to either Party, and to whom both made a very arduous Application. While this was in Agitation, and both Sides in doubt which should succeed, both the Dutch and British M-y were at their Wits End for fear of the Event. They weighed every Circumstance, canvassed every Measure, and puzzled and perplexed themselves to no Purpose, Reslection worked on Reflection, Thought on Thought; they looked on one another like Men bewildered in a Storm, expecting C 2

every Moment the finishing Gust, that must give them their Quietus, when suddenly a Glare of Light appeared from a Quarter they least expected, the Halcyon Day returned, and brightned all their Cares into Joy and Transport. They had luckily intimated to the K—g the Necessity of learning the Sentiments of the only Man they seared would necessarily succeed on a Change, now seemingly approaching; they waited some Time with Terrors enough, when at Length they were told with a gracious Smile, that their Sasety purely depended on the Dissolution of the Parliament.

The Consequence, in Regard to the Dissolution, needs not be related; that the Advice was followed, we are all clear in, and it only remains that we shew some Effects, the natural Result thereof. Agents were immediately dispatched, with proper Credentials, to every venal Borough. Now all Things went on swimmingly, and the Anti-Ministerial Men being cast in the Court of Apollo, the God, attended by Fortune and Riches, travelled with their Adversaries over the greatest Part of the British Dominions, and carried all before them; but getting drunk with too much Success, or satiated with their too easy Conquests, they overlooked the Metropolis in their Merriment, and left us Room to introduce a Scene, as extraordinary as memorable.

If my Information does not deceive me, they thought themselves sure of the City of London, and therefore set themselves down contented with arbitrarily determining who should be the Men. The List they pitched upon were Sir \mathcal{I} —B—d, Sir R—H—e, Sir W—m C—t, and Sir R—L—ke. Being now all right, and having got Men to their Mind, that is to say, such as they could not exclude, and such else as they liked, they left the Affair to take its own Course, the Success whereof we shall see

presently.

There

There was at this Time a Set of Men in the City, who took it into their Heads to form a Scheme for the investing the Election of Members of P----t entirely in the Corporation, in the M-r and A _____n, excluding thereby all the Merchants and principal Traders; thefe, with their Adherents, who expected one Day to rife to the same Dignity, assembled together at the Half Moon Tavern in Cheapfide. and had from thence the Title of The Half-Moon Club; they corresponded regularly with another Set of People, who called themselves The Independent Electors of Westminster, brought their grand Annual Affembly into the City, and there affociated with them, and drank Healths just honest enough to save them from being hanged. All this passed on smoothly for fome Time, and they thought themselves so sure of their Game, that some of their Wisdoms declared publickly, that both Cities should be so governed, and Matters so conducted at Westminster, that the Ministry should be obliged to them for any Law that was to be passed for the future; concluding, that when every Thing came to be regulated pursuant to their wife Intentions, they should carry an important Influence over the whole Kingdom, as it had formerly done in other similar Cases.

These Men had a Spy among them of their own Gang, one that had been eternally writing, jangling, and scolding for them, an honest Ministerial Scot, whose Distresses made him catch at the first Offer, and who having been left in the Lurch, by the Broad Bottoms of the Coalition, was now taking his Revenge of the whole Party. Him these refined Politicians hugged in their Bosom, and consulted in all their Schemes, which were at best not very deep, and now rendered less effectual by the Considence re-

posed in him.

So foon as it was rumoured that the Parliament would be dissolved, this Faction began to form their Councils, and entered into Considerations whom to chuse out of their Body, not dreaming they would be opposed by the Ministry, much less could any of their Fellow-Citizens presume to measure Interests with them, but for the present agreed only upon their L—d M——r's leaving it to Time and ma-

turer Councils to complete the List.

About the same Time, or soon after the Dissolution, there issued out of a little Alley in Whitechappel a Man, well known to the trading World, and often distinguished by the City for his Interest there, and Conduct in the Management of Elections. His Sagacity pointed out to him at once, though yet in Embrio, the Views of both the Court and City, the first he thought incompatible with the Interest of the City, and the last he saw plainly aimed at arbitrary Power, and the Exclusion of the only valuable Men in it. The Civil Principles of the last he did not like, and conceived the first to have no Principles at all. Under these Circumstances he applied himself to the most eminent in Trade, and whose honest Principles, as Lovers of the King and Constitution, he was sufficiently acquainted with; when, after some declining and others accepting, at Length two were pitched upon to appear as Candidates, to be put in Nomination when a public Meeting for that Purpose should be appointed. But this however kept so profound a Secret, that neither the Court, nor City Corporation were apprized thereof Time enough to take any Measures to their Injury.

Saturday, June 13, the Corporation Party had now formed their List, and were not only sure of Success in their own Minds, that they advertised the following Gentlemen to be put up, with an express

Prediction

[39]

Prediction that they would be nominated, and indeed as to two of them there could be but little Doubt. The Lift was,

The Right Hon. William Benn, Esq; Lord-Mayor, Sir John Barnard, Sir Daniel Lambert, Sir Henry Marshal.

They recited as Fact in the same Advertisement, that Mr. Heathcote declined on Account of his ill State of Health; but there was another Reason, which if Mr. Benn had equally well considered, would have made him decline too, but we shall for good Cause wave it.

We fee now, with all this Corporation Affurance, that there were hid behind the Curtain two potent Adversaries. The Court List was expected to come out, but none other suspected, until June 19, when the following appeared;

Sir John Barnard, Knt. Sir Daniel Lambert, Knt. Sling sby Bethell, Esq; Stephen-Theodore Janssen, Esq;

If any one has feen a youg Girl disappointed of her Husband the Moment the Priest was going to join their Hands, so now looked Courtier at Courtier, Corporation Man at Corporation Man. But as these last, notwithstanding they seemed very sure of their Point in one Shape or other, so they immediately agreed on two Resolutions, the one to appoint a Meeting at Grocers-Hall, the other to form a Variety of Lists, whereupon such a Number of Candidates appeared, as never before graced a City Election. These were intended to puzzle the Cause, and mar

the Merchants Interest among the Croud of Claimants; but their Friends turned this into an agreeable Joke, by dragging the most obscure to Light, and setting them to face their Brethren. By this Means, making all the Aldermens Lists appear a Farce, and turning the Citizens Attention more directly on the Merchants List, as the only one sup-

posed in earnest.

On the 23d of June the respective Candidates appeared at Grocers Hall, when the Livery, assembled there at the especial Appointment of the Corporation Class, nominated the Persons in the Merchants List by a vast Majority, and a little indecently, considering his then Character, hissed the Captain of the Corporation Band off the Hustings. And the Court List at the same Time taken very little Notice of.

There was a Game now to be played between fuch of the Candidates on the Court List, as did not come in on the Merchants, and one on the Merchants Lift, who was likewife on the Corporation's; and the Business was, to persuade this Gentleman to quit his Nomination, and leave the Merchants, in order to carry his Election. How this was effected under Hand, is too delicate a Point for me to relate, as the Author is backed by an Authority I do not chuse to contend with; he was caught in the palpable Snare, which he did not discover, until it was too late to recover himself. However I shall make this plain Remark, That the same Person, who underhand put that Gentleman in the Way to lofe his Election, by joining the Corporation, was fufficiently warned by the Consequence, when in the like Situation, not to follow his Steps, as will be prefently thewn.

The Corporation Party finding their Interest of no avail, and supposing there might be some Fatality

tality attending, by reason of their Meeting at the Half Moon Tavern, and, on the other Side, supposing something naturally auspicious at the Crown Tavern, where the Merchants assembled: As Men, distressed or bassled, usually grow superstitious, they therefore unanimously agreed to meet next at the Crown, which they did accordingly; but not happening to prove in Spirits, they parted again, without coming to any other Resolution, than that of supporting those Aldermen as should appear to have the most Hands in the Common-Hall.

The Court List, like the others, had but three contending Candidates, as Sir John Barnard was out of the Question. One of these thought himself in fo high Esteem with his Fellow-Citizens, as he was really a Man of some Merit, that he declined being chose for the County of Middlesex, in Expectation of being courted to stand for London; but that not happening to be the Case, he had the hard Fate to miss both. One of the other Candidates had but little Interest of his own, so depended on being brought in by the third, who found too much Art necessary to get himself in, to spare any of it in Aid of his Dependant. By this Means the whole List separated: the first, as I have observed, stood on every List, the second took no Care of his Interest, the third had just enough for himself, and the last shifted as well as he could.

The Court List thus disposed of, the Dispute now lay between the Interest of the Corporation and the Corporation Interest, or in other Words, between the Aldermens List, when any should be agreed on, and the Merchants.

June the 30th, 1747, the Election came on at Guildball, when the Aldermen, resolving, if possible, to have none but some of their own Body elected, were determined to put up enough of them, and, for

that

[42]

that Purpose, produced the following Lists, with Sir John Barnard at the Head of each of them, viz.

Sir Daniel Lambert, Sir Henry Marshal, Edward Ironside. Sir Daniel Lambert, Sir Henry Marshal, Sir William Calvert.

Sir Daniel Lambert,
Sir William Calvert,
Sir Robert Ladbrooke.

Sir Daniel Lambert, Sir William Calvert, Crispin Gascoigne.

Slingsby Bethel, Stephen-Theodore Janssen.

When, from the whole Number, only Sir William Calvert was nominated; fo that he flood now in the Place of Sir Daniel Lambert, and the rest remained as at Grocers-Hall, and thereupon a Poll was demanded.

If Sir Daniel now would have opened his Eyes, his Success was hardly questionable: The Merchants would still have given him their Interest, which was all any Candidate wanted to carry his Election, but he was resolved to pursue another Course, and con-

sequently lost it.

The Question then remaining, was only between the Friends of the new nominated Candidate and those of the Merchants, whether they should join Interests. Sir William's Friends proposed it, and the Merchants deliberated upon it, that is to say, Sir William's Friends proposed to join Interests with the Merchants, but to be on both Lists; but the Merchants had now a potent Adversary in Sir Daniel Lambers, and Sir William was said to have some special Engagement with Sir Robert Ladbrooke, so that in Fact the Terms were not in any Sense equal; however, as some of their Friends were uncommonly

strenuous in Favour of Sir William, the Merchants complied, at the Risque of their Elections. This short Account of that Matter will clear up to the Public the Reason of the Difference of Numbers that voted for the respective Candidates. As the Messieurs Bethel and Janssen only rested on one List, while Sir John Barnard, and Sir William Calvert, were on two Lists; which I mention, to shew that the Merchants were not deficient in their Interest, because of their different Appearance of Numbers on the Poll; on the contrary, engaged their Consorts above a thousand Votes, and were aided by very few,

if any.

To enter into all the Circumstances of this Affair. would make a little History. My Aim, by what has been related, is only to shew, that those who thought they had most Interest in the City found themselves strangely mistaken. The M-y could only make one Member, and are obliged to Sir Daniel's Miftake, and the Merchants Complaisance, for him. As to the Generality of Elections throughout the Kingdom, the Court doubtless owe many to the critical Dissolution of the last Parliament. And if this shall prove the Means of preferving Holland, and giving a new Turn to the bad Situation of our Affairs on the Continent, I most heartily wish them much Joy of the Success of their Measures. But if, on the contrary, it should prove the Occasion of an untimely Peace, I shall have quite different Thoughts of the Matter. The City of London has always been confidered of distinguished Weight, and I hope will prove so in the House by the Value of her Reprefentatives, which have never been equalled in my Memory, as being all Men of Sense, undevoted to any Party or Faction. If every County, City, and Borough in the Kingdom produced the fame, we should be very happy, and, I do not doubt, have a very agreeable Conclusion of the present War.

I can-

I cannot help observing here, on that inconsistent Conduct of our M--y, who have been fo extremely affiduous in some Places, and so negligent in others. The Story of S-d, and the Proceedings thereupon, have been too notorious to need being repeated; we have feen them baffled in the City of London: At Hull, a trading Town of fome Confequence, they were even at a Loss for a R-ve, and almost any Body might have been in, that thought it worth their while. But they may be excused as to their Diligence in this Refpect, when, as it previously appears, the Dissolution conquered the main Obstacles, and prevented, at least for the present, the Dutchy of Cornwal Records from operating to any Effect. As the Difference now appears in the H-e, the Number that Alteration would have produced could have been of little Significance: But here lay the Tutt of the Thing, could that Point have been carried, the Confequences are not fo easily foreseen, the Anti-Ministerial Party would have considered themselves then fo much nearer the Mark, as to have made it worth their while to have pushed bolder in others, which, as Matters now stand, was hardly worth regarding, and I believe very few thought it worth their while to try their Strength and Interest; nay fome even declined, where they might have been morally fure of fucceeding, as confidering it not worth while to attend, where it was impossible to carry any Point of Importance, and therefore would not be present, and answerable for Measures in no Sense agreeable to them. How far this might be justifiable in them is another Question, or whether it was better, at this delicate Conjuncture, to interrupt the Ministerial Proceedings, is perhaps too nice a Matter for every Body to determine; more especially, as it is very evidently not in their Power to make any Kind of Peace, the Nation could have

been tolerably fatisfied with. And as to the Public Money, the Raising and Manner of disposing it, may very well lie dormant for a future Enquiry, when the Enemy becomes less powerful, and a fettled Peace leaves us at Leifure to confider that Matter more attentively. And if the M-y prove fo wife to themselves, as well as just to the Nation, to fairly beat the French out of their Trade, the Advantage will be fo great, and their Measures so dignified, that few will think of calling them to an Account for Misapplication of the Public Money. I am sure I should be the last Man in the World that should dream about it, as I consider the Balance gained by the War, a fufficient Counterpoise for any Sums that can be pretended to have been squandered away. For as I consider the French Trade in general much superior to our own, I shall esteem the Acquisition of it of much superior Value to all our National Debt, previous or subsequent was it increased twenty Millions more; so that if this happens, those in Power, instead of deserving to be called to an Account, will merit Crowns of Laurel.

Here I cannot help taking Notice of a Point, which all the Great and Learned among the French feem perfectly to understand; they do not lay the Stress of their Successes, expresly, on either their Wealth or the Power of their Arms, but, most materially, on the uniform and judicious Conduct of those, who have for many Years successively directed the Helm, and which, by a Parity of Reasoning, relates equally to any other Nation, particularly to Great Britain.

Mr. Pavillon, being early in the Reign of Louis XIV. admitted a Member of the Academy of Sciences at Paris, in one Part of his Oration makes the following just Remarks:

et Gentlemen,

What Difference is there betwixt what our Fathers have feen, and what we fee at this Day? Our "Fathers have feen France begin Alliances in all the " Courts of Europe, to oppose only the single Forces of Spain, and we fee France scarce reckoning that " ancient Enemy among the Powers which Jealoufy " arms against her. They beheld the flaming Va-" lour of the French passing impetuously their Fron-" tiers, in order to make uncertain Conquests upon foreign Countries; we behold the same Valour, " but better conducted, never drawing a Sword, but at the same Time uniting inseparably to the Crown " whole Provinces. They betrayed Councils, and fquandered Treasures, rendering our Designs abor-" tive; we fee Order and Secrecy render our Pro-" jects prosperous and successful. Lastly, they saw the Shame of Treaties tarnish the Glory of their "Arms; and we fee our Victories ever crowned " by the Glory of our Treaties. We all know to " whom we are indebted for this wonderful Change; " but let not the glorious Condition, in which he has " placed us, render us ungrateful, we should again " prove the same unhappy People, had we again the " same Governors; and, on the other Hand, any "Nation would have become what we are, if it " were so happy to have a Prince like ours. When " Fortune from Time to Time has deprived us of " great Men, has she interrupted the Course of our, "Victories? Has she retarded our Enterprizes? or rather, Has she not proved, by this Means, that " the Destiny of France depends upon the Head that " governs her?"

The Compliment is here directly paid to the King, but obliquely pointed at that uniform ministerial Conduct, planned out by Cardinal Richlieu, finished

3

by his Successor Mazarine, and regularly pursued by every Minister since. The Point in View is the Glory of France, illustrated and dignified by the Honour of the King; the Means hereto, the Acquisition of Empire; the Route pursued, is by the Way of the Netherlands and Holland; the final Mark, Great Britain and Universal Commerce. We shall see presently what this has done towards the End aimed at, first considering, how far a contrary Conduct in her Neighbours has contributed thereto, in Particular, the different Ministries in the same or in various Reigns, in Great Britain, fince the Restoration. Charles. II. though restored in Opposition to the Arts of Cardinal Mazarine, yet was hardly well feated on his Throne, when he fell in with the French Interests; it is no Matter for what Reason, perhaps directly against his own Reason. His Ministry fold Dunkirk, his Parliament not only opposed it, but declaimed. against any Engagements with France, argued for the Support of the Dutch, yet contrary thereto, the fatal Year 1672 produced, by the Aid of the British Ministry, an Event, that was near giving the finishing Stroke to Holland, and, with it, to the Liberties. The Conduct and uniform Behaviour of. of Britain. the Dutch stopped short the Progress of the French Arms, and then our Ministry altered their Measures, and seemed to take Part with the Dutch; which, whether in Jest or in Earnest, matters little, the French. could not carry their Point; and now they begin to. think of raising a Navy, towards which our wife and honest Ministry contributed all their Power. But as the French Navy increased, the Power of the Dutch became better established by Land, owing to the Intrepidity of that uncommon young Hero, the then. Prince of Orange, who not only kept the Dutch steaddy and resolved, but became a Check on the British Ministry, which all their wicked Councils were notable to elude. The Event we have all the Happiness to know; the same Man, who stopped the Progress of the French Arms and saved Holland, checked the French Councils in Britain, and meritoriously became our King, and brought with him that happy Alliance, which at last turned the Arms of France into her own Bosom. Yet were our Measures then very far from being uniform, or perhaps the Dispute with France had ended with something better than a Partition Treaty, calculated by Mistake to increase her Power.

The wife Ministry that came into Play on his Survivor's ascending the Throne, with the Aid of the greatest General of the Age, surmounted the Difficulties confequent of former Errors, and carried their Point so far, as to be in Condition to secure both us and Holland for ever; but the Dutch themselves now began first to relish the French Aurum Potabile, and therefore not fo much to be depended upon, as when pushed by the Arms of France to the last Extremity, and redeemed by their gallant Stadtholder. The Ministry changed in England, and with them the steady Measures previously pursued. Here France, from being reduced by the Power of the Sword to the last Gasp, began again gradually to resume that Strength, which her uniform Measures first gave her, which supported her under the Affliction of evil Fortune, and which, in the Year 1712, redeemed her from Destruction. And here she laid the Foundation of that thriving Commerce, which, in the Year 1740, vied with all Europe put together.

Our Ministerial Conduct, in this Interval, was so far from being unisorm, as to foreign Affairs, that it was nothing but one continued Change and Perplexity. The Court of France smiled, and went on in the old Road, on one Side seeding the Dutch Rulers with Money, and terrifying the British Ministry on the other; which last Point was carried so far, that I have known the then Minister turn

pale

pale at the Name of France, which Fear he so far infinuated into all about him, that you may see it to this Day imprinted on the Muscles of his natural Successors. And when we know this the Wonder ceases, why, when all the Nation cry out to continue the War, yet are they so fond of a Peace, nay it is become so epidemic a Distemper, that even those great Orators, who formerly railed and bawled against such Fear, no sooner joined the present M—y, but instantly they began to tell dismal Tales of the magnific Power of France, and deplorable State of Great-Britain.

We may easily see from hence the different Effects of uniform and varying Conduct; we may fee what it is that carries France on fo pleasantly to the Goal, and what makes her Neighbours run so wide of the Mark; we may fee by this what France is aiming at, and may fee what Britain is coming to. And as this is the grand Point whereon our All depends, whereon every Thing that is dear and valuable to us rests; our King's Honour, our Country's Safety, and the Peoples Rights; it is necessary to enter into indisputable Proofs. That such Conduct of the French has effectually answered the End, and that if England is in a deplorable State, it is owing to vague Measures and bad Heads, and that, at all Events, a fure and unerring Remedy is still in our Power, when we have Wisdom and Honesty enough to be in Earnest, and apply it.

Before I shew what the uniform Conduct of France has effected, I shall make one general Remark, which is, That when the Disputes with her Neighbours come to Blows, they always beat her on a Parity, but that what they gain from her by War, she usually redeems by Treaty. But when France brings a superior Army into the Field, and conquers from her Neighbours, she keeps by Treaty what she carns by Conquest, generally with an Addition. So

that

that though France be oftenest beat, yet is she in the End the Gainer: Whom she cannot beat, she threatens; and those who scorn her Threats, she buys.

The general State of France, and Foundation of her Power, owe its Origin to the levelling of the Nobility, the making of the King absolute, and constituting for his Supporters the Church and the Army. This being finished, as I said before, under the Ministry of Mazarine, there remained but two plain Points to be constantly kept in View; the having of an Army at Home to awe the People, that the Taxes might come in easily, another Abroad to employ the Nobility; and, to support these, a flourishing Commerce. By this, not only all the Power, but, in Effect, all the Wealth of France centered in the King, and confequently at the Disposition of the Ministry, whose Interest it naturally must be to find them Employment, and wherein if they succeeded by Conquest, it added to the main Power, by the creating of more Court Dependants. And as the fame Army, which governed the raising of Taxes, presided over Religion too, and made all the People think, or feem to think the same, which, after some Disputes with the Inhabitants of the Cevennes, became effected; fo that there being no more Danger of future Civil Broils, and the whole Power, Civil, Military and Ecclefiastic, settled in the Crown, without Controul or Rivalry, and the Acquisition of more extended Empire necessary to satisfy all Pretenders, and preserve the Peace of the State, it remained only to refolve, that it should be preserved at the Expence of their Neighbours. Why this Point must always be strictly attended to, is apparent from what has been observed; and how it has been attended to, the following authentic Accounts will fufficiently evince, and I hope will amply prove the absolute Necessity we are under of using such Precautions, and pursuing such vigorous Measures, as are neces-

fary,

[51]

fary, at once to defend ourselves, and to reduce France into a Condition, not to be dreaded for the future.

The French Court had no fooner hit upon the Plan of reducing the Nobility and Princes of the Blood to the Condition of private Gentlemen, in every Thing but their Titles, and by that Means established a lasting internal Peace, but they immediately turned their Heads to the fetting of Europe in a Flame. The Swedes, and some Princes in Germany. were engaged against the House of Austria, and Great-Britain fell into civil Discord, whether by the Arts of the French Court, or the natural Fatality of Things, matters not. Here was the Basis laid of the rifing Glory of France; fince that Time every Year improving; though now and then with political Rests, to recover the Expence of Blood and Treasure. During the Wars in Germany, and Civil Discords in Britain, she had only Spain to deal with in the Low-Countries, for which, in her new State, she proved so much too powerful, that even the Dutch, the natural Enemies of Spain, began now to grow jealous of her Power, which produced Treaty of Munster 1648. And the same Year our Charles the First being divested of his Throne and Life, and the State of Affairs in Britain growing thereupon towards a Settlement, the French Court condescended to give Europe a short Interval of Peace. without taking its Eye off from that engaging Profpect of making future Acquisitions, since with so much Facility effected. From this Time, as the Dutch were grown jealous of the French, fo the French, on their Part, had in View effectually to remove that Jealoufy, by making the even United Provinces their own: But as this must be done by pasfing the Dominions of Spain first, the Protectorate of Britain was engaged in a War both with Spain and Holland, and the French Court, which had before D 2 folemnly

folemnly renounced any Right to the Low-Countries, now entered it with an Army, and by giving Dunkirk to England, made the greater Part of the Netherlands their own, and which, by the Treaty of the Pyrenees, 1659, were in a great Measure ceded to them. But as Treaties on the French Scheme were only made to be broke and giving, merely adding Power to get more; and as foon after happened the Restoration of Charles the Second, and with it, contrary to all reasonable Expectation, an underhand Alliance with Britain, so the French Court continued pursuing their Point in the Netherlands, until they had opened their Way to the Frontiers of Holland on one Side; had got Possession of most Part of Lorrain and Luxemburg on the other, and some Acquisitions on the Frontiers of Spain and Italy. "I can-" not help here making a flight Digression. On the " making the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, Killegrew, " Charles the Second's Jester, happening to be at the " French Court, was asked by Louis XIV. whether " he had not acquired great Honour by his Arms, " and the Success of that Treaty; which Killegrew " answered in French Epigram, in English turned " thus:

" Luxemburg you feiz'd, by Fraud acquired Bur" gundy,

"Lorrain you stole, by G-d you'll pay for it one day."

The Treaty of Aix la Chapelle was made 1668, and thereby the Plan matured, for the Conquest of the seven United Provinces, and Universal Monarchy; as that Britain must have fell next, in the then Situation of its Affairs, is hardly to be doubted, Charles a Pensioner of France, and the People Slaves to Charles. In 1672 the Plan was put in Execution, nor was it in the Power of the English Parliament to persuade Charles

Charles of the Danger. A great Part of the seven Provinces were overrun: But Providence, which overrules the Power of human Politics, here checked the French Arms; the Genius of William Prince of Orange rose superior; the French Emissaries and Mercenaries among the Dutch were destroyed or subjected; and the French Army at length fairly drove out again, but the Seeds of their Influence lest to shoot

up anew, in due Season.

The Prince of Orange's Gallantry, and the close Attention of the English Parliament, to the Preservation of Holland, as the Bulwark of their own Liberties, brought King Charles to think it his Interest to stop the French Career; which, in the Year 1679, by the honest Industry of Sir William Temple, produced the Treaty of Nimeguen, which, though it added Acquisition to the French Dominion, lost France the main Point in View, and turned it's Politicks another Way. It's Glory now began to fade, and the Honour of it's Arms to tarnish. The Empire began to fear it's own Fate, and to form Leagues for the common Defence; into which the Emperor, the Swedes, and several Princes and Circles of the Empire engaged. The French nevertheless, difregarding Treaties, as they were beat out of one Part possessed themselves of another, and, in 1680, made the whole District of Namur their own. In 1681 the Duke of Savoy put Casal into their Hands, and the same Year they overran most Part of the Palatinate, and seized the Town of Strasburg. In 1684 the French Court saw a Cloud rising on the one Side, and on the other being intent on fecuring England in their Interest, by a Prince made for their Purpose then mounting the Throne: And in Order to be the better able fully to effectuate their Defigns, found a breathing Time necessary, and therefore proposed a Truce; which was readily accepted, as both Holland and the Empire wanted the like, to accomplish those deep

deep laid Views, which soon after broke out into Action. and were the Basis of the future Security of Europe. These produced at once a Revolution in England, mounted King William on the Throne, and formed the first Grand Alliance. This was a Stroke upon France as fatal as unexpected, and rendered the Year 1688 for ever memorable. The Refult of this was a regular War, that ended confiderably to the Dishonour of France, and concluded with the Peace of Reswick, September, 1697. By this Treaty most of the French Acquisitions on Spain and the Low-Countries were given up to their proper Sovereign; which perhaps would not have been fo eafily confented to, if the French Court, seeing themselves in a losing Train, had not turned their Thoughts on acquiring them again, with large Addition, another Way. That is to fay, to have the whole Dominions of Spain into the Bargain, having then formed a Plan for making a Prince of France King. To attain this Point, King William and the Dutch were dextrously drawn into the famous Partition Treaty, which caused the Allies to lay down their Arms, divided their Interests, and separated Bavaria from the Empire. The Effect consequent hereof is sufficiently within every Man's Knowledge, not to need entring into particularly. It produced a War, which in some Measure answered the Views of the French Councils. by placing the Person intended on the Throne of Spain. On the other Side Part of Flanders, &c. returned into the Hands of another Branch of the House of Austria, and Part became a Barrier to the Dutch.

From what has happened fince it will appear unaccountable to Posterity, how it happens that the same People, who so gloriously defended their Country in the Year 1672, and, after having beat the French out, so steadily pursued their Point, and by the Assistance of Great Britain and the House of Austria.

Austria, attained so much new Territory as was ceded to them by the Peace of Utrecht, should within the Course of thirty Years imbibe such different Sentiments of the political State of Europe; as on the Appearance of a French Army, not only to give up their Barrier tamely, but also to betray those very Allies, who first procured it for them, and could since have secured their Defence: And to make it still more surprizing, have even used Art to surrender their native Country into the Hands of France.

Here it is necessary to remind the Reader as briefly as possible, that the same Sentiments reigned amongst a certain Faction of the Dutch, even in the Year 1672, or the French then had not dared to have entered their Country. De Witt's Maxims, now generally known, were then deeply instilled into the principal Burghers. And the true Reason of preferring the French, to the English Interest, founded obviously on a certain Knowledge, that they could only become Tyrants under the Protection of the French. and under that Power establish an absolute Aristocracy. This fettled Principle, though overpowered by the superior Genius of the late King William, lay still brooding at their Hearts, carefully nursed and inculcated among the capital Families, and produced those Effects, which have now brought their Country to the Brink of Destruction; and ought to convince us, that until the Stadtholder gets into ample Power, how little the Dutch are to be trufted; and it would be happy for Europe, if the Dutch were alone in bad Measures. There are various Means leading to the fame End; what the Dutch Governors have aimed at, by introducing French Armies, some of those, who have had too much Influence here, feem to have had their Eye upon, by endeavouring first to ruin our Commerce, and, after having reduced us to Want and Mifery, established our Constitution on a new Model, on that Nonsense of the Landed Landed Interest, and a perpetuated Slavery. To this End it is that we are hurried into unnecessary Debts, improved and aggravated by the loading of Commerce with high Duties, and by neglecting all the natural Channels, by which Money should flow into the public Revenue, and answer the utmost Exigencies of a War. It is happy for us, that human Judgment is very short-sighted, and that it is full as probable, such wicked Measures will fall on the Heads of the Aggressors, as on the People, who have been more than once too hard for the profoundest Politicians. In the Course we now pursue, it can be but few Years before some great Change happens; we shall be this Year at least eight Millions in Debt, and in less than two more at a Crisis; unless retrieved by some dextrous Change of Meafures. We have feen, by the brief preceding Hiflory, what have been for a Century past, and what still are, the French Views. The Measures of the Court of France still equally uniform, pointing directly to the same End. We know, because every Day's Acts informs us, that ours are destroying the very Vitals of our Existence, and cutting short a lingring Confumption, by giving the Death's Stroke.

It is very remarkable, that there is but one Point between us and France, and which soever carries it must rule; this is, which shall have the whole Plantation Trade, whereof Sugars is the principal. The French act, on their Part, as Men reasoning on, and conversant with Commerce; we like Men that make it no Part of our View. They lessen their Duties as we in Proportion raise ours, and so in Course rob us of the foreign Markets. To counterpoise this we have a superior Navy, but are undermining its sole Support: The French Navy is inferior, but they are laying a solid Foundation to raise and improve it. Our Navy costs us three Millions a Year, and we sink one more by raising the Duties on Trade; the French

Navy hardly one Million, and they gain two Millions by their Trade: So that in Fact there is four Millions difference in our Naval Articles. What we gain by our Navy by taking Prizes, we return to France by Infurances on Interest or no Interest. So that whatever direct Advances the Dutch make towards becoming a Province of France, we only vary from them by indirect and oblique Courses; the Pursuit of both, by different Means, tending to the same End. Thus if the Dutch become Subjects of France, it will be with a good Grace, replete with Trade and Wealth, but whenever that happens to be our Fate, we shall surrender ourselves Beggars.

It is true, that I am not at all afraid it will be our Case, but conceive that it must be a violent Convulsion that can save us; and which must happen suddenly, unless a very extraordinary Change in our Measures succeeds. Our Debt will be soon one hundred Millions, which would be a Dream, if every Thing was conducted right; our Naval Power using its utmost Efforts, an Army able to sace the Enemy in the Field, our Trade encouraged, and our Taxes rightly placed; but if neither, or not all of these, are arduously attended to, the Consequence is at once

plain and evident.

I do not take it to be fo very material, whether what I conceive to be the Cause of our hurrying so precipitately into Debt, be the true one, as that the Fact is true, and consequently has some Cause; it being out of Dispute, that, in a four Years War with Spain only, a War in itself of little Consequence and needlessly expensive, and in a four Years War with both France and Spain, we have, including Desiciencies, &c. ran near thirty Millions in Debt; when in a twenty Years War, from the Revolution to the Peace of Reswic, and from Queen Ann's Accession to the Peace of Utrecht, our whole Debt was about sifty Millions. And in this War have considerably

siderably increased our Duties on Trade, which therefore, bad Oeconomy excepted, I take to be the true Cause of this enormous increasing Debt. I say nothing of Smuggling, that Bane of Trade, here, because it is the natural Consequence of loading Commerce with high Duties. Thus, whether the Cause assigned be the true one, as I said before, the Fact is but too true, and the Remedy very evident.

We are now going to enter on a fresh Campaign, in a Country where the Run of the Powerful are the Friends of France; where, under a Notion of having the Aid of their Arms, we may expect to be betrayed; where Burghers Wives, Daughters, and Infants in the Cradle, are Officers, and depute their Book-keepers or Footmen to act for them; where our own Soldiers are discouraged, by being overpowered by Numbers; and when our Trade is so treated at Home, that we must soon lose it's Support. This every Man must confess is but a melancholy Prospect.

Our Hopes in the mean Time are centered in the Prince of Orange's getting the better of the French Party, and effectually rooting them out of the Army and Government; on the Russian Forces coming timely in to our Aid; on our Naval Affairs being pursued with Spirit; and of our bringing such an Army into the Field, as may be able to face the

French.

How far the Prince of Orange may be able to fucceed, confidering how much the Dutch Army are tainted, may be rather conjectured than ascertained. When the Russian Forces will arrive, as they may be interrupted in their March, Time only can discover. How far our Navy is intended to act with Vigour, they only know who are to direct it's Progress. And as to the completing of the Army, there are two Things to be considered; the Method of acquiring more British Troops, and the being sure of having those

those we pay for of the Austrians. In order to acquire fufficient for the British Army, it is first necessary to consider what idle People we have in the Kingdom. and which Sort of them are most proper to serve in the Army. These I take to be Labourers, who do not chuse to work, and Footmen that are not needful. Of either of these I shall say little, not intending here to form Projects; and therefore shall only observe, that if every Parish was obliged by Law, as in Queen Anne's Time, to fend their idle People, it would perhaps at once recruit the Army, and ease the respective Parishes. As to the Footmen, they have usually been too well fed, to be readily able to live on common Soldiers Pay; it might be prudent to find them fuch Officers, as could afford them more out of their own Purses; which, as the Push is greater now, the Conjuncture more delicate than in the Rebellion, would be equally honourable to them; but however this may be, there feems an absolute Necessity for bringing, at least, 20,000 more Troops of our own into the Field, and which may be raised by a very moderate Degree of Diligence, and the Nation the better, every Way, for their Absence. But supposing that due Regard be had to the completing of our Army in Flanders, it is necessary to consider, at the same Time, how to fave an Equivalent another Way. It feems a determined Point with the French to out-number us in Flanders, as their main Views all center there, and confequently, if we increase our Power, they will follow the same Steps. This must be done either by the Aid of their Allies, or by drawing their Forces from the Side of Italy. The last seems most probably the Case, as the Army kept there is rather intended to defend their own Frontiers, than to invade Italy. It will follow, that if Troops enough be left the King of Sardinia to balance the French Forces, and to defend his own Dominions, and the Austrian Frontiers

Frontiers on the Side of Genoa, the rest may be

withdrawn into the Low-Countries.

It may be remembered how we were treated by the House of Austria in the last War, who, instead of pursuing the Advantages in their Power, by ravaging the South of France, turned their Arms another Way, and, at our Expence, conquered Naples and Sicily to their own Use. This was then the less regarded, as we were Conquerors on the Side of Flanders, and in Germany. But as the Case is now very different, it is more our Concern that Holland be preserved, than that the Austrians take Genoa, which they feem more to fet their Hearts upon, than the Benefit of the Common Cause. There is now of well appointed Men, at least thirty Thousand in Arms for the Defence of that State. no Body presume, that less than 50,000 are sufficient to make any Progress against them acting on the defensive: On the contrary, if the Austrians only defend their own Frontiers, twenty Thousand may be fufficient, as the Genoese will hardly care to hazard more of their Troops, if any, for the making of Conquests. Consequently, if the Austrians can find fifty thousand Men wherewith to attack Genoa, thirty thousand of them ought to be drawn off into Flanders; as it is of infinitely more Importance to us and the Dutch, who together pay all, that Holland be preferved, than that Genoa be taken, suppoling it in the Power of the House of Austria to effect, which I really believe it is not, as their Proceedings hitherto have fufficiently evinced; they having neither Artillery, nor other proper Means, to profecute the Siege of a Town, where by the Addition of new Works, and a strong reinforced Garifon, they are in a much better State of Defence than before: So that I cannot help looking upon all Motions that Way as a Scheme to perpetuate the War, by draining us of our Wealth, and enriching with

with it an Ally, who feems not to have the Common Caufe cordially at Heart, at least more specially their own particular Interest in View. But as we cannot afford this, so ought we not to suffer any Scheme to be purfued, repugnant to, or interfering with the main End for which this War was entered into; the Defence of the Low-Countries and Italy. and the Improvement of our own Commerce, by the Ruin of that of France. This must fix our Eyes, and direct our Measures, or a short War, and honourable Peace, can with no Reason be expected. We are not, in this dangerous Conjuncture, to confider what will best suit the Views of our Allies; it is fufficient that we find them Money, and thereby enable them to defend themselves against the growing Power of the common Enemy; but it is in no Sense necessary, that they should grow rich, or acquire Dominion at our Expence, especially when the Enemy is in our own Bosom. In a Word, our chief Strength by Land should be drawn into the Low-Countries, and if with them Holland can only be defended two Summers, there is nothing more obvious, than that the French may be glad to quit all their Conquests, and be the first to sue for a Peace.

This will appear very evident, when the following Considerations are duly attended to. In the first Place, as it is agreed between us and Holland, that the French Commerce shall not be any longer supported by Insurances, which have hitherto kept up their Credit, and enabled them to trade. In the next Place, as there will be a large Augmentation to our Naval Power by what the Dutch are to fit out this next Year, and considering that the French Navy by our late Captures is reduced too low to be significantly recruited, or to make any Figure for the future at Sea. There is no one hardly so ignorant of Foreign Affairs, but must know that the Dutch can now sit out alone and man a better Fleet than the French

and Spaniards together; nor can be infensible, that the great Trade carried on by the French is a sufficient Inducement to the fitting out of Privateers. This gives us the fairest Prospect imaginable of entirely ruining the French Trade, which would be most certainly effected, if a proper Method was fallen into here of encouraging the fitting out of more Privateers, which might be fo managed as that they might be on different Occasions of Service to the State, and to the Owners. For as the French Convoys are usually too strong for the Privateers, so on the other Side would two or three of them be of great Service in strengthening such Squadrons of Men of War as cruize for the Enemy, and that rather want Numbers than Force. This appeared in both the late happy Rencounters with the French when we took many of their Men of War, but for want of a Number of fmaller Cruizers loft the greatest Part of the Merchant Ships. This shews us at the same Time the Means whereby the French Trade may be effectually destroyed, and the Reason of using such Means. There would, I doubt not, be many more Privateers fitted out if the Hazard was not too great for the Generality of People, and that there is no regular Establishment whereby private Ships may cruize with the Men of If it is worth while for private Men to adventure, it is much more for the Publick to engage fo far as to the furnishing the Shipping with Provifions, and taking for the fame an adequate Share of the Captures. A Capital of five hundred thousand Pounds on this Plan would contribute as to Provisions and warlike Stores, to keep constantly at Sea forty or fifty flout Privateers, and the Money possibly return to the Publick again with ample Interest, and answer a much better Purpose than the same Number of small Men of War, as they would cost the Publick nothing, and more affuredly attend their Duty, because their whole Dependance would be on Prizes. I would

I would not be understood, that the Navy should be any Way lessened, I am only attempting to shew how easy it might be improved, on the equal Chance of gaining or losing sive hundred thousand Pounds.

I wish I had room here to plan out a Scheme to this Purpose, as I conceive the only fair Chance we have to give an entire new Face to the War, must depend at last on our Naval Conduct. It is there only the French cannot overpower us by Numbers, nor make their Alliances useful. I am sensible Holland must be defended, and that there is a Necessity of increasing our Land Forces; but this I conceive will be at best but acting on the Defensive; and consequently, that unless fomething very shining is executed in the Naval Way, the War may be protracted to our utter Destruction. For so long as the French can keep a Superior Army in the Field, can hold the rich Provinces in the Low-Countries, and continue their Commerce without fensible Interruption, fo long must the War continue. We have wifely begun in putting a stop to Insurances; I hope this Instance of publick Wisdom will be the Mother of many judicious Meafures. We have hitherto treated the War with Wantonness; surely at last we shall be in Earnest! Now the Affair is become fo very ferious, that it is almost within the Cast of a Die what shall be our Fate. The making of a Stadtholder in Holland amply counterpoifes all the French Acquisitions. We have a very fair Chance to recover our Losses in the East-Indies with Interest; the Newfoundland and Cape Briton Fishery is secured to us; the Channel of the Levant Trade dammed up, and there remains only that we attend closely to the Ruin of the Enemy's West-India Trade. And as I hope there is no Truth in the Suggestion, that we intend to ruin our own first, by increasing the Duty on Sugars; so I doubt not to see this War happily ended with the entire Destruction of the French Commerce; which must

be

be done, or as I have shewn before, all our Labour is vain, our Debts are much too high to be paid by any other Means in Nature; and as they must be higher, there is no Alternative left us, but to have a Peace on our own Terms, or become the Slaves of France. A Choice every Briton must detest. In a Word, one of us must now fall, which, next under Heaven, is in our own Power to determine, and I doubt not, but we shall be honest enough to ourselves to make a happy Election.

Here I shall beg Leave, by Way of Conclusion, to make some brief Remarks on the Nature of Universal Monarchy, whereby perhaps our own Situation may be best understood, as I intend to imprint on the Minds of my Fellow-Subjects some peculiar Maxims, that I hope the present Generation, and

Posterity, may be the better for.

Dominion is founded on two Principles, Wealth and uniform Councils. Wealth is acquired by Trade, and is the Basis of Power, but it is uniform Councils that raises and finishes the Structure. Thus Great Britain, by the Spirit and Genius of her People, may grow wealthy, but her Constitution is not formed for extended Dominion, as her Councils are in one continued Course of Fluctuation. But, on the other Side, while the People are wealthy, and attentive to their Security, they are not to be conquered. Errors of a Ministry are corrected by the Watchfulness of the Community. It is good therefore, that Men write often in Defence of the People, to awake an indolent, instruct an ignorant, or correct a wicked Ministry. Political Writings may fometimes rife into Licentiousness, but are always the Barriers of Liberty. And it is better that fuch Writers are fometimes licentious, than that a Ministry is always fo. The first can only ruffle, the last must ruin. As Great Britain is preserved, and her Influence some-

what augmented by the Spirit of the People; France augments her Power by the Uniformity of her Councils, and a Kind of natural Pertinacity or Promptitude to rule in her People. She has, strictly speaking, no Constitution at all, and consequently no Bounds to her internal Power, nor Check in her Pursuit of Dominion: There is nothing to correct in her Frame, nor any Subject intitled to interfere with the Measures of the State, which is at full Liberty to extend it's Power to the utmost of it's Strength; therefore let France have Wealth for it's Basis, and Dominion will be assuredly constructed thereon. In Contests not effectually pursued she will tire out, and ruin any free State; her Councils are only to be broke through by main Force, there is no treating with her on a Parity. Prussia is rising on the same Bottom, and the House of Austria has been folely supported on the Principles of Uniformity. Every Minister in a free State either proceeds on a new Plan, or moves by none at all. If on a new one, the Chain is broke that should hold the State together, and if on none at all, then the Spirit of the People governs. To give Liberty to the Press in France would be as ridiculous, as to take it away in England; where the Subject has no Liberty he has no Right. The King has more at Stake than the People, therefore a Right to govern as he pleases, so that his Subjects be treated on the fair Principles of Humanity. In a free State every Subject is a Sharer in the Legislature, and therefore, when debarred the Freedom of Speech or writing with Decency, is deprived of the only Distinction between him and a Slave; from that Moment the whole System of Government is annihilated, and vests absolutely in the Sovereign.

I thought it proper to fay so much, as it is part of the State of the Nation to understand our natural

Rights, and to be guarded against a Bill in Embrio, projecting to destroy them; since it matters little that we have shewn what particular Affairs are transacting, when perhaps one is in Agitation of more Importance to our Welfare than all the rest put together: It fignifies nothing who conquers Holland, or what becomes of our Commerce, if we are foolish enough to lofe ourselves: But as that I hope will never happen, it is our special Business to take Care it never shall, and then we have nothing else to do but to diligently attend to the balancing the uniform Councils of France, by the right Use of that auspicious Power, which the native Spirit and Genius of the People has rendered truly awful to our Enemies. It is our Courage must do all, Treaties are Tricks upon us, Phantoms with Peace on their Foreheads, playing before our Eyes to hide from our Sight the Instruments of Ruin and Desolation following in their Rear. We are no Way a Match for France but in a War, it has always ruined her, and preserved us; it ever must do so, if we pursue it with Vigour. It is not the Genius or Skill of Frenchmen that over-match us in Treaties, but the Nature of their Councils, not to be reached with the same Facility as ours. must know what is doing, and where and when a Minister is pushed in a free State, while the Minister of absolute Sovereignty holds all the Mystery and Resolutions of the State in his own Bosom. If the Prince is under his Influence, as must necessarily be the Case, his Power is uncontrollable, being of Dignity next the Sovereign, while the Minister in a free State is at best a mere nominal Officer that the Law is a Stranger to, he is only the common Agent made Choice of by the Sovereign, to transact between him and the People in such Affairs as concern the publick Welfare. We see then by the different Nature of Governments where our Strength lies, and where our Weakness; and cannot be deceived in one essential Particular, which which is, that when we know we are superior to the Enemy, to pursue that Superiority. This Hint is fairly given us by the Court of France, suggested by common Sense, and infinuated by Self-Preservation. The French understand their Superiority by Land, and pursue it to the utmost Extreme. Their Gentry, who would be otherwise idle, and perhaps disturb the Repose of the State, are here employed to their best liking. In this Way they love to shine, and find it the most natural Road to Fortune's Favours. If by this Means they can subdue their Neighbours, Commerce will naturally fall into their Hands without the Expence of a Navy, and the Empire of the World

in Course become their own.

We have a much shorter Road to Empire, if we chuse to pursue it, since it matters little who governs within Land, so we preserve the Sea-Coasts and Commerce, which no Power by Land can divest us of, or make useful to themselves, if they are once effectually cut off from trading on their own Bottoms; but Dominion by Sea must follow that on the Land, if not timely prevented. This is the Point now fingly to be attended to. The View of the French Court, in the Conquest of Holland, is, by the Aid of that brave Maritime People, to be Masters of the Universal Commerce. They are prepared for it by the fine Course of Trade already in their Hands, which this Acquisition may fingly complete. By a Parity of Reasoning, our Attention ought to be turned at once to the Preservation of Holland, and Ruin of the French Commerce. It fignifies nothing to correct domestic Errors, and quarrel with one another about Power, when the Business before us is, Whether we shall be a People. Our Patriots have fatally wrangled themfelves into Places, and us into Inattention to the great End of our Preservation. We have been afraid of the French, until they have acquired Power to make

make them feared; yet is our Situation changed for the better, and what an uncommon Pufillanimity prevented us doing, when we might have effected it with Facility, a vertuous Resolution and Steadiness in the main Body of the People, has opened to us a fair Track to Glory, when the Difficulty appears almost insurmountable; as it is now seen that Holland may be eafily preserved, and that the whole Circle of the French Trade is absolutely at our Devotion. If those employed by the Public will not own their former Errors, a conscious Shame will furely stimulate them on to endeavour Amendment, by putting our Navy into the best Condition imaginable for Action, and by giving all possible Encouragement to Privateers, which, with what the Dutch may contribute thereto, I hope will finish the War happily this fucceeding Summer, and make the French Commerce pay all our Debts. As this, and this only, executed with Vivacity and Address, can, in all human Probability, fave us; fo I hope I shall be excused for treating the same Subject in so many different Shapes, as it is a Point that cannot be too deeply inculcated. Various Manners of Reasoning hit different Conceptions, and it is our Business here to fatisfy all, of the Rectitude of vigorous Measures: of the Necessity of faving Holland; the making of the French Commerce pay all our Debts; and of the commanding fuch a fure, folid and lasting Peace, as may never, for the future, be in the Power of France to evade or prejudice.



